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Abstract 
 
The task of this thesis is to critically review the established position, regarding the 
distinction that exists between compensable indirect and non-compensable regulatory 
expropriation by states.  It is commonly asserted that indirect expropriation by states will 
merit swift and adequate compensation for investors that suffer damage to their property.  
However indirect expropriation that is the result of the exercise of state regulatory 
practices will not result in any such award to investors.  In order to be convincing the 
distinction between these two practices must be clearly identifiable.  Moreover the 
concepts used to construct these doctrines must be sufficiently robust to withstand logical 
scrutiny.  The central argument of this thesis is that the distinction is not sufficiently clear 
to be credibly defended in the context of investment disputes. 
 
Throughout, this thesis draws on the rulings of investment tribunals and the writings of 
scholars on how this distinction has been created and subsequently defended in 
international investment law.  Furthermore it also seeks to grapple with the challenges that 
appear evident in reconciling the rights of states and investors when dealing with a claim 
of expropriation. 
 
The intention in doing so is to appraise the accepted wisdom, and to highlight the 
underpinning rationale so as to demonstrate the fundamental flaws that have created the 
current state of affairs in international investment law.   
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
The law of foreign investment is one of the most dynamic areas of international law.1  
Within this sphere, investors and host state’s come together and form a relationship which 
will, hopefully, be to their mutual advantage.   
One of the most topical areas within the field of international investment law is that of 
expropriation.  Arguably, the subject of the greatest debate in this field is the difference 
that is said to exist, between compensable expropriatory acts and non-compensable 
expropriatory acts.2  In the past the distinction was said to have been quite clear, until it 
was ‘befuddled’ by the expansion of the concept of expropriation in international law.3  
Central to this challenge is the question of the relationship between the essential regulatory 
powers, the ‘police powers’ and the legitimate protection of investors in international 
investment law.4 From the doctrinal point of view the main controversy lies in 
distinguishing what in the standard international investment law vocabulary is commonly 
described as indirect expropriation from bona fide, police power regulatory expropriation.5  
The basic framework, in principle, is very clear: Indirect expropriation is a form of 
expropriation that can be caused by regulation.  However it is distinct from direct 
expropriation due to the fact that while it does not transfer title to property, it still attracts 
the principle of compensation.  Opposed to this is the idea of regulatory expropriation 
which is distinguished from indirect expropriation, not because regulation is involved but 
the fact that there is no compensation due to be paid to aggrieved investors.    
 
 
 
                                                          
1 R. Dolzer, and C. Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford, 2012) p12;See also K. 
Miles, The Origins of International Investment Law, (Cambridge, 2013)  
2 ibid p120; A. Newcombe, ‘The Boundaries of Regulatory Expropriation in International Law’, (2005) 
ICSID Review, Vol. 20(1), p3; R. Higgins, ‘The Taking of Property by the State: Recent Developments in 
International Law’, (1982-III) 176 Recueil des Cours 259, p331 
3 M. Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment, (Oxford, 2012), p363.  In the US the practice 
is to refer to expropriations as ‘takings’, but this terminology will not be adopted in this thesis.   
4 Ibid p374.   
5 A. Newcombe, ‘The Boundaries of Regulatory Expropriation in International Law’ (2005) ICSID Review, 
Vol.20 (1), p25 
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Both international investment law scholarship and tribunal practice broadly reflect that 
states are entitled to regulate domestic affairs under the rubric of ‘police powers’. 
However, there is often some confusion as to what precisely the concept of ‘police powers’ 
actually means,6 which causes some concern in the context of investment disputes where a 
state’s adoption of regulatory measures results in no compensation being paid to the 
investor.  As a result, some scholars have questioned whether the distinction between 
indirect expropriation and regulatory expropriation is able to stand up to logical scrutiny.7  
Unfortunately there has been little consensus on this issue in international investment law.  
It is for this reason that it will be the subject of discussion in this thesis.    
 
The methodology of this thesis is derived to a large extent from the work of Jacques 
Derrida and in particular his theory of ‘deconstruction’.8  ‘Deconstruction’, as it is 
understood here, is an analytical operation that has as its central aim the identifying of 
“hierarchical oppositions, followed by a temporary reversal of the hierarchy”.9  The point 
of this reversal is not only to demonstrate a false dichotomy between the two ends of the 
opposition.10  The aim is to demonstrate the similarities and differences that exist within 
this hierarchy and which are otherwise commonly suppressed or overlooked,11 and to 
highlight the inconsistent manner in which the hierarchy is thus maintained   In 
international investment law it is a well-recognised rule that a state’s expropriation of the 
property of foreign investors, whether exercised for public purposes or not, warrants swift 
and adequate compensation.12  However where a state expropriates the said property 
through the use of ‘police powers’ and in pursuit of bona fide public interest, it is often 
assumed also that there should be no requirement to compensate investors for any 
                                                          
6 ibid; see also V. Been and J. Beauvais, ‘The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA’s Investment Protections 
and the Misguided Quest for an International “Regulatory Takings” Doctrine’, (2003), N.Y.U. L. Rev., Vol. 
78, p53 
7 See R. Higgins, ‘The Taking of Property by the State: Recent Developments in International Law’, (1982-
III) 176 Recueil des Cours 259, p331 where she asks “Is this distinction intellectually valid?  Is not the State 
in both cases (that is, either by taking of a public purpose, or by regulating) purporting to act in the common 
good?  And in each case has the owner of property not suffered loss?”  
8 See J. Derrida, Of Grammatology (Gaytri Chakravorty Spivak trans., Johns Hopkins University Press 1976, 
1967) 
9 J. Balkin, ‘Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory’ (1986) Yale L.J, Vol.96 (4), p746.  The author does 
appreciate that the idea of being able to define the approach of Deconstructivism is controversial, given that 
Derrida himself famously remarked that he did not want future disciples of his to simply act and write as he 
does.  See J.Derrida, The Politics of Friendship (2005, Verso) p42.  However, for practical purposes a 
definition here aims to provide a grounding for the use of Deconstruction and its application to law.   
10 J. Balkin, “Deconstruction’s Legal Career’” (2005) Vol. 27 Cardozo L.Rev p729 
11 Ibid p730  
12 OECD “ “Indirect Expropriation” and the “Right to Regulate” in International Investment Law”, OECD 
Working Papers on International Investment, (2004, OECD Publishing) p2.  Available at 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/WP-2004_4.pdf  
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detrimental impact they may have suffered.13  The conceptual framework that underpins 
this distinction, thus, seems to be premised on a clear – and as Derrida would argue – 
clearly hierarchical distinction between two oppositional concepts: expropriation and 
regulation.  This thesis will attempt to demonstrate the fundamental instability of this 
conceptual framework by, firstly, highlighting the essential similarities shared by the two 
opposite concepts; and secondly, by arguing that the opposition between them is not 
intellectually viable.    
 
The use of deconstruction in legal scholarship is traditionally associated with Critical Legal 
Studies (CLS), to which the author owes a debt of gratitude for providing a framework as 
to how to apply deconstructive theory to the law.14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 C. Henckels, “Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate: Revisiting Proportionality Analysis and 
The Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitration” (2012) J Intl Econ L, Vol. 15 (1), p225 
14 See D. Kennedy, “A Semiotics of Critique” (2001) Cardozo L. Rev Vol. 22 (2), p1189: “There are four 
steps to follow as one gets ready to do some critical theory within law…First: identify a distinction that 
drives you crazy…Second: find in each half of the distinction the traits, things, aspects, qualities, 
characteristics, or whatever was supposed to be located in the other half, and vice versa…Third: put the 
question whether the distinction which you have just destabilized corresponds to a real division in reality on 
hold…and instead try to figure out why people who use the distinction work so hard to maintain belief in it in 
the face of their own doubts…Fourth: trace the consequences of the distinction”.  The author does appreciate 
that the idea of the analytical tool of Deconstruction being reduced to a formula to be repeated over and over 
again in non-philosophical fields is in direct opposition to what Derrida had in mind.  See R. Mailey 
‘Deconstruction and the law: a prelude to a deconstructive theory of judicial interpretation’ (2012) LL.M 
(R) thesis, University of Glasgow p68.  However, the framework which Kennedy offers makes 
Deconstruction more palatable to the author.    
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Chapter 2 
Expropriation 
 
One cannot understand the meaning of the concept of indirect expropriation in modern 
international investment law, without first understanding the founding principles of the law 
of expropriation more broadly.  Since its infancy as the ‘law governing the protection of 
alien property’,15 international investment law has developed into a highly sophisticated 
system for the protection of investors interests.  The purpose of this chapter is to establish 
the distinctions which exist within the conceptual framework that is used in the law of 
expropriation, and to illustrate how these distinctions are identified in practice by 
investment tribunals and commentators.     
 
The concept of expropriation in international law has been traditionally defined as 
“…individual measures taken for a public purpose”.16  Much of what would be 
traditionally considered expropriation occurred historically in the context involving actions 
by developing state’s who sought to reassert control over their resources, as part of their 
anti-colonial struggle.17  The act of expropriation, or the taking of title to property of 
foreign investors is not in itself an illegal act, a fact long recognised in customary 
international law.18   Nevertheless, the established consensus holds, certain criteria have to 
be met for expropriation to be valid.  Thus the Restatement (Third) state’s: 
 
[a] state is responsible under international law for injury resulting from: (1) a taking 
by the state of the property of a national of another state that (a) is not for a public 
purpose, or (b) is discriminatory, or (c) is not accompanied by provision for just 
compensation.19 
 
This same view is supported by international judicial practice.  As noted by the Permanent 
Court of International Justice (PCIJ): 
 
                                                          
15 Dolzer and Schreuer, supra, n1,  p1 
16 OECD, supra n12, p3  
17 S. Ratner, ‘Corporations and Human Rights: A theory of Responsibility” (2001) Yale. L.J, Vol.111 (3)  
pp454-457.   
18 K. Schefer, International Investment Law: Texts, Cases and Materials, (2013, Glos) p168 
19 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987)  
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[O]ne of the essential elements of sovereignty is that it is to be exercised within 
territorial limits, and that failing proof to the contrary, the territory is co-terminous 
with the Sovereignty.20 
 
The Permanent Court of Arbitration also recognised the sovereign right of states to 
expropriate under international law: 
the power of a sovereign state to expropriate, take or authorize the taking of any 
property within its jurisdiction which may be required for the "public good" or for 
the "general welfare".21 
 
This same position is held also by the scholarly authorities.  Thus Reinisch writes that 
expropriation is lawful and within a state’s sovereign authority under international law 
provided that the terms of the Restatement (Third) are observed.22  Sornarajah notes that 
“…the state has a right to control property and economic resources within its territory to 
enhance its economic, political and other objectives”.23  Furthermore as Haque and 
Burdescu write, the power of state’s to expropriate stems from “…principles of 
sovereignty” in international law.24   
 
In modern practice, the use of direct expropriation by states has become increasingly rare, 
owing to the negative international political consequences that attach to such actions.25  
Investors will understandably invest in state’s that operate a stable economy in a prudential 
way, which have a history of honouring international commitments.  State’s will attempt to 
provide such a forum, with a view to using foreign investment to develop their domestic 
interests.  As a result it is unlikely that a state will consciously seek to directly expropriate 
foreign investments, if such action can be avoided 
                                                          
20 North Atlantic Fisheries Arbitration (Great Britain v United States of America) (1910) 11 RIAA 167, para 
180 
21 Norwegian Shipowners Claims (Norway v United States), Award, 13 October 1922, Vol.1, p332.  
Available at http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_I/307-346.pdf  
22 A. Reinisch, ‘Expropriation’ in The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law, ed. P. Muchlinski, 
F. Ortino and C. Schreuer (2008, Oxford), p437.  See also P. Isakoff, ‘Defining the Scope of Indirect 
Expropriation for International Investments’, (2013), Global Bus. L. Rev Vol.3, p191 and A. Lowenfeld, 
International Economic Law, 2nd edition (2008, Oxford) p559 
23 Sornarajah, supra n3, p364 
24 I. Haque and R. Burdescu, ‘Monetary Consensus on Financing for Development: Response Sought from 
International Economic Law’ (2004) B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev Vol.27, p249 
25 Schefer, supra n18, p203 
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Expropriation can occur through other, less obvious means.26  The concept of indirect 
expropriation was developed to accommodate for this fact.  What exactly this concept is 
supposed to cover, however, remains a matter of considerable contention.  Some 
commentators have proposed to identify indirect expropriation as any act short of direct 
expropriation that “… leaves the investor’s title untouched but deprives him of the 
possibility of utilizing the investment in a meaningful way”.27  An alternative definition 
that has been suggested is of its being “…the result of a progression of [state] regulatory 
measures”.28  Still others have suggested the broad definition of “wealth deprivation”.29  In 
light of the various opinions on the meaning of indirect expropriation that exist, as noted 
by Olynyk, “…most investment treaties do not expressly address the issue of indirect 
expropriation”30.  Different legal texts have addressed indirect expropriation in different 
ways.  Most investment treaties will “…prohibit expropriations and ‘measures having 
equivalent effect’”.31    In the Harvard Draft Convention on the International Responsibility 
of State’s for Injuries to Aliens, indirect expropriation is defined as, 
 
any such unreasonable interference with the use, enjoyment, or disposal of property 
as to justify an interference that the owner thereof will not be able to use, enjoy, or 
dispose of the property within a reasonable period of time after the inception of 
such interference.32 
 
Furthermore the 1992 World Bank Guidelines state that: 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
26 L. Fortier and S. Drymer, ‘Indirect Expropriation in the law of International Investment: I Know It when I 
see It or Caveat Investor?’ (2004) ICSID Review, Vol.19(2), p297 
27 Dolzer and Schreuer, Supra n1, p101 
28 P. Isakoff, ‘Defining the Scope of Indirect Expropriation in International Investments’ (2013) Vol.3 Global 
Bus. L. Rev p195 
29 OECD, supra n12, p3.  See also B. Weston, ‘Constructive Takings under International Law: A Modest 
Foray into the Problem of Creeping Expropriation’ (1975) Va. J. Int’l L. Vol.16 (1), p112 
30 S. Olynyk, ‘A Balanced Approach to Distinguishing Between Legitimate Regulation and Indirect 
Expropriation in Investor-State Arbitration’ (2012), Intl’l Trade & Bus. L. Rev, Vol.15, p260 
31 R. Dolzer and M. Stevens, Bilateral Investment Treaties (1995, The Netherlands), p.245 
32 Draft Convention on International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens, Art.10(3)(a), in L.Sloan 
and R. Baxter, ‘Responsibility of States for Injuries to the Economic Interests of Aliens’ (1961) Am. J. Int’l 
L., Vol.55, p553 
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A state may not expropriate of otherwise take in whole or in part a foreign private 
investment in its territory, or take measures which have similar effects, except 
where this is done in accordance with applicable legal procedures, in pursuance of 
good faith of appropriate compensation.33 
 
Moreover the Energy Charter Treaty provides that: 
 
Investments of investors of a Contracting Party in the Area of any Contracting 
Party shall not be nationalised, expropriated or subjected to a measure or measures 
having effect equivalent to nationalization or expropriation…34 
 
Many of the investment treaties that have been entered into by France refer to “measures of 
expropriation or nationalisation or any other measures the effect of which would be direct 
or indirect dispossession”.35  Furthermore UK investment treaties refer to measures 
“having effect equivalent to nationalisation or expropriation”.36  This is also the practice of 
the United States: 
 
Neither Party may expropriate or nationalize a covered investment either directly or 
indirectly through measures equivalent to expropriation or nationalization.37  
 
This practice is also reflected in Chinese investment treaties: 
 
Neither contracting Party shall expropriate, nationalize or take other similar 
measures (hereinafter referred to as ‘expropriation’).38 
 
However these treaty provisions do little to provide clarity on what are largely vague and 
wide-ranging definitions of indirect expropriation. 
                                                          
33 World Bank, World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment (1992), available at 
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/WorldBank.pdf  
34 Energy Charter Treaty, opened for signature 17 December 1994, 2080 UNTS 95 (entered into force 16 
April 1998) 
35 OECD, supra n12, p6 
36 ibid 
37 US Model BIT 2012, art.61. 
38 Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the 
Republic of Cote d’Ivoire on the Promotion and Protection of Investments of 30 September 2002, art.4.1 
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The common theme that emerges from the various definitions seems to be that in principle, 
the question of how to distinguish between direct and indirect expropriation ought not to 
pose any problems: direct expropriation by a state will see an investor lose legal title to 
their property,  indirect expropriation in contrast will leave the legal title to property intact, 
but may have some other negative impact on the value of the investment, “…depriving an 
owner of fundamental rights of property”.39  Reading through the literature suggests 
another important distinction: indirect expropriation unlike direct expropriation will 
typically occur following a series of state actions, as opposed to a single act.40  The 
language used in many bilateral investment treaties (BITs), as evidenced above, reflects 
this understanding.41   
 
Both states and investors will present different views on what will or will not constitute an 
indirect expropriation, with a view to protecting their own interests.  The work of 
international courts and tribunals is instructive in pointing out how international 
investment law identifies instances of an indirect expropriation across vastly differing 
factual circumstances.  
 
One of the more well known instances of a claim by investors that their investments had 
been the subject of indirect expropriation was in the German Interests in Polish Upper 
Silesia42 case.  The case concerned a dispute between Germany and Poland following the 
signing by the German Government in 1915, with the Bayerische Stickstoffwerke 
Company of Trostberg, Upper Bavaria, of a contract which provided for, amongst other 
things, the construction of a nitrate factory at Chorzow (Upper Silesia).  Land had been 
acquired on behalf of Germany which was entitled to exercise a degree of control over the 
factory, a share in its profits and the conditional right to terminate the contract.  The 
machinery and equipment were to be installed by the Company, which would be 
responsible for managing the factory and for this purpose, was permitted to make use of all 
its patents and licenses.  In December 1919 the German Government sold its interest in the 
Chorzow factory – the land, buildings, stocks etc – to a new company while the 
management and operation of the factory was to remain with Bayerische.  However the 
                                                          
39 Fortier and Drymer, supra n26, p294 
40 ibid, p297 
41 ibid 
42 Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Germany v Poland) (Jurisdiction) [1926] PCIJ Ser A No 
7.   
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decision by a domestic court reversed the sale, and provided for the property rights in the 
company to be returned to Poland.  A Polish representative took possession of the factory 
and all patents and licenses.  The matter was eventually brought before the PCIJ where it 
was claimed that the rights of the Bayerische had been infringed following the decision by 
Poland to take over the factory.   
 
The Court ultimately ruled that the taking of the factory did constitute an indirect 
expropriation of the patents and licences to which the Bayerische had a right: 
 
Moreover it is clear that the rights of the Bayerische to the exploitation of the 
factory and to the remuneration fixed by the contract for the management and 
exploitation and for the use of its patents, licenses, experiments, etc, have been 
directly prejudiced by the taking over of the factory by Poland.  As these rights 
related to the Chorzow factory and were, so to speak, concentrated in that factory, 
the prohibition contained in the last sentence of Article 6 of the Geneva Convention 
[adopted to implement the Treaty of Versailles] applies in respect of them…and the 
attitude of Poland in regard to the Bayerische has therefore…been contrary to 
Article 6 and the following articles of the Geneva Convention.43     
 
As noted by Kriebaum, the Court “…did not distinguish between a direct and indirect 
expropriation as far as the legal consequences and effects of the interference were 
concerned”.44  As such, the ruling is not as sophisticated as that of later decisions by 
investment tribunals.  However the decision is sufficiently clear to demonstrate the 
occurrence of indirect expropriation by states in international law. 
 
The PCIJ dealt with issues of expropriation in a number of other cases, most notably in the 
Oscar Chinn case.45  The case concerned a dispute between the UK and Belgium regarding 
the support given by Belgium to state ran businesses.  Mr Chinn was a British national who 
ran a shipping business on the Belgian Congo in 1929.  His main competitor was a 
company that was controlled by the Belgian state.  During the 1930’s Belgium experienced 
an economic crisis during which, the government ordered all state owned businesses to 
                                                          
43 ibid, para 44 
44 U. Kriebaum, ‘The PCIJ and the Protection of Foreign Investments’ in Legacies of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice , (ed.) C.Tams and M. Fitzmaurice Vol.13, p157  
45 The Oscar Chinn Case (Britain v Belgium), Judgement, 12 December [1934], PCIJ.  Available at 
http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1934.12.12_oscar_chinn.htm  
15 
 
reduce their carriage charges and assured them that the government would reimburse them 
for any losses they suffered.  This had a severe impact on the shipping business on the 
Congo.  Mr Chinn was forced to close his business before the Belgian state offered any 
reimbursement to non-state controlled businesses.  The UK government exercised 
diplomatic protection for Mr Chinn and brought a claim before the PCIJ alleging, amongst 
other things, that the measures of the Belgian state indirectly deprived Mr Chinn of “…any 
prospect of carrying on his business profitably”46 and that this “constituted a breach of the 
general principles of international law, and in particular of respect for vested rights”.47 
 
The Court acknowledged that the measures taken by the Belgian state did have a negative 
impact on Mr Chinn’s financial position.48  However it was not persuaded that his having 
to endure a less than favourable business environment was indicative of a breach of 
international investment law on the part of Belgium: 
 
The Court…is unable to see in [Mr Chinn’s] original position - which was 
characterized by the possession of customers and the possibility of making a profit 
- anything in the nature of a genuine vested right. Favourable business conditions 
and goodwill are transient circumstances, subject to inevitable changes ; the 
interests of transport undertakings may well have suffered as a result of the general 
trade depression and the measures taken to combat it.49 
 
The Court made clear that a change in the economic conditions is a typical hazard of 
operating in a commercial environment, and that it is not evidence of a violation of vested 
rights by a state.50  It went on to state that the actions of the Belgian Government: 
 
… cannot, however, be regarded in itself as an admission by the Belgian 
Government of a legal obligation to indemnify the transporters for an encroachment 
on their vested rights; it is rather to be ascribed to the desire of every government to 
show consideration for different business interests, and to offer them some 
                                                          
46 Ibid, para 98 
47 ibid 
48 Ibid, para 99 
49 ibid 
50 Ibid, para 100 
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compensation, when possible. The action of the Government appears to have been 
rather in the nature of an act of grace.51 
 
This ruling of the PCIJ is further evidence of how traditional international law dealt with 
allegations of indirect expropriation in early investment disputes: while the Court 
recognised the impact of the measures taken by Belgian state on Mr Chinn, it refused to 
recognise them as amounting to a case of indirect expropriation.  
 
The approach of the PCIJ towards claims of indirect expropriation should be compared 
with that of modern international investment law, as in the case of Goetz v Burundi,52 
where an International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) tribunal 
had to rule on the revocation, by the host state, of a free-zone status accorded to a foreign 
investor.  The company AFFIMET, incorporated in Burundi, was involved in the 
production and marketing of valuable metals, and was owned by a group of Belgian 
investors.  AFFIMET was provided with a ‘certificate of free zone’ by Burundi in 1993, 
which bestowed tax and customs exemptions on the company.  However, two years after 
having granted the certificate, Burundi withdrew AFFIMETs tax and customs exemptions, 
arguing that the free zone regime no longer applied to companies involved in the extraction 
and sale of ore.  As a result of the withdrawal of the certificate of free zone, the Belgian 
investors suffered losses.53    Although the tribunal found that there had been no formal 
taking of property – no direct expropriation – it found that the government’s actions 
constituted a measure having similar effect to expropriation and agreed that an indirect 
expropriation had taken place: 
 
Since…the revocation for the Minister for Industry and Commerce of the free zone 
certificate forced them to halt all activities…which deprived their investments of all 
utility and deprived the claimant investors of the benefit which they could have 
expected from their investments, the disputed decision can be regarded as a 
‘measure having similar effect’ to a measure depriving of or restricting property 
within the meaning of Article 4 of the Investment Treaty.54 
                                                          
51 Ibid, para 101 
52 Antoine Goetz v Republic of Burundi, Award, 2 September 1998 ICSID Reports 5. 
53 Introductory Note, Antoine Goetz v. Republic of Burundi (ICSID Case No.ARB/95/3).  Available at 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC53
6&caseId=C151  
54 Goetz v Burundi, supra n52, para 124 
17 
 
 
Note the tribunal’s reasoning as to what constitutes indirect expropriation.  While it was 
conceded that there was no direct expropriation, the tribunal had regard for the fact the free 
zone certificate was the only thing that allowed AFFIMETs operation to be commercially 
viable in Burundi and its removal was deemed sufficiently detrimental to fall foul of anti-
expropriation provisions.   
International investment law practice has also had to deal with claims concerning questions 
of indirect expropriation, in cases where the main issue at hand involved the organisation 
of the administrative system of a state.  A classic illustration of this was in Metalclad v 
Mexico.55   Metalclad, a US company, had been given permission to develop and operate a 
dangerous waste landfill by the Mexican Federal Government, which was built in March 
1995.  The company had concluded an agreement with federal authorities on how the 
facility would operate, but the local authority challenged this and issued a denial of 
construction permit that was requested thirteen months earlier.  The local authority also 
obtained a judicial injunction that prevented the facility from operating through May 1999. 
As a result, Metalclad suffered losses on its investment and argued that Mexico had 
violated Article 1110 of the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which 
provides that “no Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment 
of an investor of another Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to 
nationalization or expropriation of an investment”.  The arbitral tribunal found that Mexico 
had indirectly expropriated Metalclads investment,56 through a combination of (i) an 
untimely and disorderly procedure for the granting of construction permits57; (ii) the fact 
that no other organisation other than Metalclad required a permit to construct in that area58 
and; (iii) the denial of a permit by the authorities without any sound, verifiable reasoning.59 
The main argument that led to this conclusion, thus, was the argument that in modern 
international investment law the concept of expropriation will include not only instances of 
a direct taking or transfer of legal title from investor to state, but also instances of covert 
taking or interfering with the economic benefit due to the investor even if this benefit is not 
                                                          
55 Metalclad Corp v Mexico, Award, 30 August 2000 ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1.  Available at 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0510.pdf  
56 Ibid, para 107 
57 Ibid 
58 Ibid, para 108 
59 Ibid, para 106 
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obviously accrued to the state.60  In arriving at this conclusion, crucially it also held that 
even if state measures did not provide for a financial or other kind of benefit to be amassed 
for the state, it could still be deemed to be an indirect expropriation.  The ruling of the 
tribunal in Starrett Housing v Iran61 endorses this point where it stated that: 
 
[I]t is recognised by international law that measures taken by a State can interfere 
with property rights to such an extent that these rights have been rendered so 
useless that they must be deemed to have been expropriated, even though the State 
does not purport to have expropriated them and the legal title to the property 
formally remains with the original owner.62 
 
Arguments about indirect expropriation often revolve around a state’s alleged confiscation 
of property in some form or another.  In Metalclad, the tribunal took issue with the actions 
of state authorities because they had failed to observe the requisite due process: 
 
By permitting or tolerating the conduct of Guadalcazar in relation to Metalclad 
which the Tribunal has already held amounts to unfair and inequitable treatment 
breaching Article 1105 and by thus participating or acquiescing in the denial to 
Metalclad of the right to operate the landfill, notwithstanding the fact that the 
project was fully approved and endorsed by the federal government, Mexico must 
be held to have taken a measure tantamount to expropriation in violation of 
NAFTA Article 1110(1).63   
 
This was deemed sufficiently detrimental to Metalclads operation to be deemed an indirect 
expropriation and demonstrates the depth of analysis that tribunals can engage in when 
deciding claims of expropriation.   
 
 
 
                                                          
60 Ibid at para 103. It should be noted that this dispute was brought before the Tribunal under the provisions 
of NAFTA.  The Tribunal, when issuing its decision, spoke specifically about expropriation under the 
NAFTA. 
61 Starrett Housing Corp v Islamic Republic of Iran (1983) 4 Iran-US CTR 122 
62 Ibid, p154 
63 Metalclad v Mexico, supra n55, para 104 
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From a brief review of the decisions of investment tribunals regardless as to the specifics 
of a given dispute, tribunals are still able to identify an instance whereby a substantive 
aspect of an investment has been removed by a state’s actions.  Furthermore this has been 
deemed sufficiently severe to result in a finding of indirect expropriation having taken 
place.  While this evidence is instructive it does present an issue: how is state regulation of 
investors property, and any accompanying impact thereon dealt with in international 
investment law? 
 
The majority of legal texts in international investment law reflect the view that where a 
state enacts a measure which is considered to be within the accepted limits of state 
sovereignty, there is no need to compensate an investor for any ensuing damage to its 
property interests.64  Higgins draws attention to this and states: 
 
The position seems to be (and the present writer finds the underlying policy 
difference hard to appreciate) that a taking for a public user requires just 
compensation to be paid; whereas an indirect taking for regulatory purposes does 
not.  The distinctions seems to lie not between formal and indirect taking, but rather 
in the purpose of the taking.65 
 
Thus formulated the legal position of the host government clearly enters into a conflict 
with the right of foreign investors to the protection of their investment.66 As Weiner notes: 
“…a great deal of the activity of the modern state entails regulating social and economic 
activity in ways that interfere substantially with the enjoyment of property rights”.67  As a 
result, the impact of state regulatory measures on investments has become the subject of 
intense debate in investment tribunals. 
 
                                                          
64 See Art. 10 (5) of the Harvard Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to 
Aliens; “Restatement of the Law Third, the Foreign Relations of the United States”, American Law Institute, 
Vol I, 1987, Section 712, comment g 
65 Higgins, supra n7, pp330-331 
66 Fortier and Drymer, supra n26, p298 
67 A. Weiner, ‘Indirect Expropriation: The Need for a Taxonomy of “Legitimate” Regulatory Purposes’, 
International Law Forum 166 (2003), p.167.  Available at 
http://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CCYQFjAB&url=http%3
A%2F%2Fwww.ila-hq.org%2Fdownload.cfm%2Fdocid%2F5AA21CEF-29AC-4835-
A0E4BA9706340EE1&ei=LjOQVNKWKNHW7QbUlIHICg&usg=AFQjCNFVE8mHy87vbl0zfLp6UrLVg
n3D9g ; Commentators note that in cases where investors question the use of state regulations that have had a 
detrimental impact on their investment, the language used to describe such occurrences is that of ‘regulatory 
expropriation’ as opposed to indirect expropriation, see Newcombe, supra n5, p25 
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As Nikiema writes,68 one of the first cases to distinguish between regulatory expropriation, 
and indirect expropriation in modern investment practice was the case of Too v USA.69 The 
case concerned an Iranian national who was also the owner of a cold-storage trailer found 
in the state of Arizona that he argued was wrongfully expropriated by the United States.  
The authorities of Arizona had made attempts to inform Mr Too about this trailer and the 
impending auction for abandoned property.  Mr Too failed to try and recover the trailer, 
which was later sold at auction by Arizona.  The tribunal dealt with the claim that the 
trailer had been indirectly expropriated by United States in the following terms: 
 
[A] State is not responsible for the loss of Property or for other economic 
disadvantage resulting from bona fide general taxation or any other action that is 
commonly accepted as within the police power of State’s, provided it is not 
discriminatory and is not designed to cause the alien to abandon the property to the 
State or to sell it at a distress price.70 
 
A similar approach was followed also in the case of Methanex v United States.71 Methanex 
Corporation was a Canadian-based manufacturer of methanol, an ingredient in a gasoline 
additive commonly called MTBE.  Methanex did not manufacture the MTBE itself; 
however, a significant percentage of the methanol it produced was used in the making of 
MTBE. Methanex was a leading manufacturer of methanol for the American market, but 
approximately 47 per cent of the market was supplied by domestic U.S. companies.  
Following concerns raised by environmental groups, the state of California banned the use 
of MTBE as a gasoline additive because it was polluting surface water and groundwater in 
the state.  Methanex argued, however, that the state imposed the ban due to a political deal 
with a rival company that made ethanol, a substitute for methanol and MTBE as a gasoline 
additive.  Amongst other things, Methanex argued that California had and should have 
used alternative approaches less damaging to Methanex’s investment.  Methanex claimed 
that the state of California’s failure to pursue such measures resulted in an occurrence of 
                                                          
68 S. Nikiema, ‘Best Practices, Indirect Expropriation’, International Institute for Sustainable Development 
(2012, Manitoba), p17 
69 Emmanuel Too v Greater Modesto Insurance Associates and the United States of America, Award, 29 
December 1989, Iran-US CTR, vol.23; see also Suez Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona SA, and 
InterAgua Servisios Intergales del Agua SA v Argentina ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17 Decision on Liability, 
30 July 2010.  Available at http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0813.pdf  
70 Ibid, p378 
71 Methanex v United States, Final Award, 3 August 2005. UNCITRAL. Available at 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0529.pdf  
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indirect expropriation.72  The tribunal, in dealing with Methanex’s claim that its investment 
had been subject to expropriation as a result of the Californian ban on gasoline additive 
MTBE, said the following; 
 
In the Tribunal’s view, Methanex is correct that an intentionally discriminatory 
regulation against a foreign investor fulfils a key requirement for establishing 
expropriation.  But as a matter of general international law, a non-discriminatory 
regulation for a public purpose, which is enacted in accordance with due process 
and, which affects, inter alios, a foreign investor or investment is not deemed 
expropriatory and compensable unless specific commitments had been given by the 
regulating government to the then putative foreign investor contemplating 
investment that the government would refrain from such regulation.73 
 
As noted by Reinisch the implication of both the Too and the Methanex rulings was, that 
those measures that are non-discriminatory state actions that serve some kind of public 
purpose would be removed from the scope of what would otherwise be deemed a 
compensable loss of property.74   This is precisely what has happened in international 
investment law, in the sense that there is now a categorisation in expropriation law that 
accords a special status to state regulatory measures that interferes with investors property.  
As Kreibaum writes: 
 
…it is established in international law that not every regulatory interference with 
property rights that has negative effects, is an expropriation requiring 
compensation.  To question that State’s regulatory power would make the exercise 
of many State functions impossible.75 
 
The challenge as Sornarajah writes, “…is to find a rational basis for the distinction”76 
between instances of compensable indirect expropriation and non-compensable regulatory 
expropriation.  
 
                                                          
72 Methanex v United States Case Summary, pp82-83.  Available at 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2011/int_investment_law_and_sd_key_cases_2010.pdf  
73 Methanex v United States, supra n71, Part IV, Ch D, p4, para 7 
74 Reinisch, supra n22, p437 
75 U. Kriebaum, ‘Regulatory Takings: Balancing the Interests of the Investor and the State’ (2007) J. World 
Investment & Trade, Vol.8, pp720-721 
76 Sornarajah, supra n3, p374 
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At the heart of the doctrine of regulatory expropriation lies the concept of police powers.  
Defining the concept ‘police powers’ is, as Newcombe writes, problematic.77  Some 
suggest that ‘police powers’ refers to those powers held by State’s “…to protect essential 
public interests from certain types of harms”.78  Another definition that is often suggested 
is that ‘police powers’ is “All forms of domestic regulation under a state’s sovereign 
powers”.79  Neither of these definitions give any detail on what are ‘essential public 
interests’ or what forms of ‘domestic regulation’ fall under a sovereigns power.  Despite 
this lack of clarity, in the international investment law context, the operative consequences 
of the use of ‘police powers’ by a State is understood to refer “…to the measures that 
justify a state action that would otherwise amount to a compensable deprivation or 
appropriation of property”.80  
 
The use of state police powers was the subject of debate in the of Sedco v Iran,81 which is 
largely representative of the doctrinal position of ‘police power’ regulatory expropriation 
in international investment law.82  Sedco owned a 50% share of Seridian Drilling Company 
in Iran, and controlled its operations in Iran through the 1970s.  Following a surge of unrest 
in Iran in late 1978, Sedco removed its expatriate personnel, and ended its activities in 
1979.  Later following a request from the Iranian government, Seridan restarted partial 
operations in March 1979, although Sedco notified the government that certain drilling rigs 
could not be operated without the return of expatriate personnel.  The National Iranian Oil 
Company cancelled the contracts connected to the inoperative rigs and began operating the 
rigs themselves.  In the summer of 1979, the Iranian government requested that a Sedco 
supervisor be stationed in Iran.  In response, Sedco asked for information concerning the 
number of rigs still needed by the Iranian government.  Instead of responding, in late 1979 
the Iranian government appointed “provisional directors” of Sediran to replace those 
appointed by Sedco, as well as a supervisor of Sediran’s drilling operations.  Having 
received no favourable reply to its request for information, Sedco terminated its contract in 
November 1979.  On August 2, 1980, the Iranian government ordered the transfer of 
Sedco’s ownership shares of Sediran to the government.  At the same time, Sediran’s 
                                                          
77 Newcombe, supra n5, p26 
78 ibid 
79 Ibid; see also Nikiema, supra n68, p19  
80 ibid 
81 Sedco, Inc v National Iranian Oil Co., 9 Iran-US Claims Trib. Rep. 248(1985) 
82 See I. Brownlie, Public International Law (2003, Oxford) 6th edn, p509. 
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drilling rigs and other equipment were retained and used by the government.83  As a result 
Sedco brought a claim before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, alleging that its 
operation had been the subject of expropriation by the National Iranian Coal Company and 
the Islamic Republic of Iran.  In dealing with the claim of expropriation, the tribunal held 
that; 
 
[it is] an accepted principle of international law that a State is not liable for 
economic injury which is a consequence of a bona fide ‘regulation’ within the 
accepted police power of state’s.84 
   
However the application of the ‘police powers’ doctrine to investment disputes has not 
been consistent.85.  Tribunals have noted that while they support the principle, 
 
…international law has yet to identify in a comprehensive and definitive fashion 
precisely what regulations are considered ‘permissible’ and ‘commonly accepted’ 
as within the police power or regulatory power of State’s and, thus, non-
compensable.86 
 
 This has caused some difficulty both for tribunals in attempting to apply the law 
consistently, and for investors hoping to understand when conduct by a state affecting their 
property will be compensable.87  In an attempt to provide clarity, Weiner suggests that 
                                                          
83 L. Monroe, “Decisions of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal”, Am J Intl L Vol.80 (2) (1986), p969 
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international conventional and customary law, along with state practice will determine 
what constitutes a legitimate exercise of police powers or government regulation.88   
 
Thus it has been suggested by Newcombe that the employment of ‘police power’ 
regulation for the protection of the environment and human health might justify non-
compensation.89  Weiner writes that “…it is significant that both the developed and 
developing world have in recent decades accepted the importance of environmental 
protection as an important state interest”.90  He also writes that this, when viewed 
alongside the International Court of Justice’s recognition of the importance of respect for 
the environment under international law, is likely to exempt state measures that aim to 
protect the environment from being deemed indirectly expropriatory.91 In the case of 
Methanex v United States mentioned above, the respondent state argued that the basis of its 
ban was for a public purpose – the avoidance of the harmful effects of MTBE - in view of 
scientific evidence that there were significant risks and costs associated with water 
contamination due to the use of MTBE.92  The tribunal took the view that the ban was 
“…motivated by the honest belief, held in good faith and on reasonable scientific grounds, 
that MTBE contaminated groundwater and was difficult to clean up”.93   
 
The suggestion that measures taken by a state for environmental protection are within the 
‘police powers’ of State’s and non-compensable, has not been met with consistent support 
in investment disputes and was the subject of debate in Tecmed v Mexico.94  Tecmed was a 
Spanish company with subsidiary companies in Mexico, which brought an expropriation 
claim against Mexico regarding its investment in a waste landfill it acquired in 1996. 
Tecmed claimed that the Mexican authorities failure to renew of a licence required to 
operate the landfill, removed any value of its investment, and amounted to an 
expropriation. The Mexican authorities argued that their refusal of the licence was, 
amongst other things, with a view to protect the environment, within the state’s police 
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powers, and was not an expropriation.95 The Tribunal in dealing with the claim of 
expropriation went on to state that, 
 
…no principle stating that regulatory administrative actions are per se excluded 
from the scope of the Agreement, even if they are beneficial to society as a whole 
—such as environmental protection—, particularly if the negative economic impact 
of such actions on the financial position of the investor is sufficient to neutralize in 
full the value, or economic or commercial use of its investment without receiving 
any compensation whatsoever. 96    
 
This ruling confirms that state measures, taken with a view to protect the environment, will 
not always be accepted as a legitimate use of police powers and justify that investors are 
not compensated. While academics agree on the existence of a right of governments to 
regulate to protect the environment, they acknowledge that to date, there are no cases that 
provide guidance on addressing environmental harms in a modern regulatory context.97 
 
Another area where states could be exempt from the requirement to pay compensation to 
investors for regulatory interference, is Taxation.98  It is suggested that taxation is 
generally considered to be inextricably bound to the practice of government.  However it is 
possible that the exercise of this governmental power can result in economic effects that 
may not be dissimilar to indirect expropriation. Newcombe notes that a significant tax 
burden (50-60%) may be imposed on investments, without it being deemed 
expropriatory.99  The viability of the ‘police power’ of taxation as a non-compensable 
exercise of governmental authority was the subject of debate in Link-Trading v 
Moldova.100 The claimant was a US-Moldovan joint venture company created in 1996 
under Moldovan law.  It was created to sell products imported into Free Economic Zone of 
Chisinau (“the FEZ”), to retail cusomers..  In November 1996, Link-Trading registered as 
a resident of FEZ and, under Moldovan legislation at that time, was initially exempted 
from the import duties and value-added taxes on goods it brought into the FEZ.  Link-
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100 Link Trading Joint Stock Company v Department for Customs Control of the Republic of Moldova, Final 
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Trading customers were exempt of up to US$600 from the duties and taxes on goods 
imported from the claimant in the FEZ into the customs territory of Moldova.   
 
The US $600 limit was reduced in March 1997 to US$400 and then again in December 
1997 to US $250.  In July 1998, the exemption was revoked via an amendment to 
Moldovan law.  Link-Trading protested and argued that this was in breach of a 
governmental guarantee of a ten-year period of stability in the tax and custom regime.  
Link-Trading asserted that the revocation of the tax ememption constituted an indirect 
expropriation.  Moldova responded that the amendment of the tax and duties regime was 
carried out as part of a normal and proper exercise of the State’s regulatory powers.  In 
dealing with this dispute, the tribunal was not convinced that the Claimant’s business had 
been expropriated, as a direct result of their tax exemption being revoked.  The tribunal 
drew attention to, amongst other things, the fact that the language of the law governing the 
levels of exemptions explained that they would be set up “…annually”.101  As a result of 
this the tribunal held that there were no grounds for believing that the exemption would not 
be subject to review and possible modification.102  The Tribunal went on to note however 
that fiscal measures will become expropriatory when they amount to an unfair, arbitrary or 
discriminatory taking or the violation of a state undertaking.103 
 
There is no evidence to date that supports the proposition that a particularly high level of 
taxation alone, by a State on foreign property, will be deemed to be an indirect 
expropriation.104  However both investment tribunals105 and commentators106 appear to 
agree that international law protects against taxation that is confiscatory, that “takes too 
much away from the taxpayer”.107  The categorisation of a level of tax as being 
confiscatory, or expropriatory seems to centre on whether or not it causes a ‘substantial 
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deprivation’ to the investor.108  However Gildemeister does concede that while the use of 
such terminology is useful in the abstract, it is very difficult to define with any real degree 
of clarity and that much will depend on the approach taken by the tribunal in each 
particular case.109  As a result, it has been noted that while taxation falls within the 
accepted definition of the sovereign ‘police powers’ of state’s,110 Newcombe notes that its 
use will not always excuse state’s of the need to compensate investors for its interference 
with investors property.111 
 
It has been suggested, as Vadi notes, that state measures that purport to protect or preserve 
cultural property may be exempt from the need to compensate, where they result in 
damage to a foreign investors property.112  This matter was the subject of debate in what 
has become known as the Pyramids case.113  The dispute centered around the development 
of a tourist village at the pyramids of Giza.  During the construction of the village, objects 
of archaeological significance were discovered.  This prompted staunch opposition to the 
continuation of construction by the Egyptian parliament which was followed by a series of 
governmental measures that resulted in the cancellation of the project.  The claimants 
eventually brought a claim before an ICSID tribunal claiming that the actions of the 
respondent constituted an expropriation of its investment.    The respondent replied in a 
counterclaim where it argued that the cancellation of the project was a requirement of both 
Egyptian and international law, citing the 1972 UNESCO Convention for the Protection of 
the World Cultural and National Heritage.  In dealing with the claim the tribunal stated: 
Clearly, as a matter of international law, the Respondent was entitled to cancel a 
tourist development project situated on its own territory for the purpose of 
protecting antiquities…The decision to cancel the project constituted a lawful 
exercise of eminent domain.114 
The tribunals meaning is quite plain from its comments.  However it went on to hold that: 
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The rules of Egyptian law and international law governing the exercise of the right 
of eminent domain impose an obligation to indemnify parties who legitimate rights 
are affected by such exercise…The obligation to pay fair compensation in the event 
of expropriation applies equally where antiquities are involved.115 
This ruling serves as yet another example of an instance where an investment tribunal, 
while recognising the legitimacy of a state’s actions, nevertheless requires that 
compensation be issued to foreign investors.  The evidence above does little to demonstrate 
any clarity on what ‘public purposes’ will remove the obligation of states to compensate 
investors for measures that have a negative impact on their property. 
Another common theme that emerges from the literature regarding ‘police power’ 
regulatory expropriation, is that the doctrine of ‘police powers’ is not sufficiently clear.116  
In ADC v Hungary,117 the tribunal considered the limits of state’s’ regulatory powers.  In 
1994, ADC, a Canadian company, won the right to construct, renovate and operate two 
terminals at the Budapest-Ferihegy International Airport In 1995, ADC concluded an 
agreement with the Air Traffic and Airport Administration (ATAA), a Hungarian State 
agency, which laid down the terms and conditions of the transaction.  The Agreement 
provided that the term of the works would be twelve years from the date of the operations 
commencement, with a possible extension for another six years.  
 
In 1998 ADC, successfully finished construction and renovation of the Terminals and 
operated them until the end of 2001. On 20 December 2001, the Hungarian Minister of 
Transport issued a decree for the transformation of ATAA.  The statutory successor of 
ATAA, Joint Stock Co. Budapest Ferihegy International Airport Management Ltd., sent a 
letter to ADC notifying it of the decree and stating that it would take over operational 
control of the Airport from 1 January 2002. In 2003, ADC brought a claim before a 
tribunal alleging that their investments had been expropriated by Hungary as a result of its 
decree to transform the ATAA, depriving them of their rights to operate the airport 
terminals and to benefit from future opportunities.  The tribunal accepted the claim that 
there was an indirect expropriation and rejected Hungary’s argument that it was merely 
exercising its right to regulate in the following terms: 
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The Tribunal cannot accept the Respondent’s position that the action taken by it 
against the Claimants were merely an exercise of its rights under international law 
to regulate its domestic economic and legal affairs.  It is the Tribunal’s 
understanding of the basic international law principles that while a sovereign State 
possesses the inherent right to regulate its domestic affairs, the exercise of such 
right is not unlimited and must have its boundaries.  Therefore, when a State enters 
into a bilateral investment treaty like the one in this case, it becomes bound by it 
and the investment protection obligations it undertook therein must be honoured 
rather than be ignored by a later argument of the State’s right to regulate.118 
 
This ruling by the tribunal is useful in so far as it establishes that a state’s right to regulate 
is subject to constraints.  The tribunal went on to note that while investors must comply 
with a host state’s laws and regulations, they would not be forced to submit to whatever 
demands the host state makes.119   
 
The discussion above should demonstrate the lack of clarity as to what in fact will be 
deemed a bona fide exercise of state police powers.  Investment tribunals have profound 
difficulties in applying the doctrine in investment disputes given that, as the discussion 
above demonstrates, the substance of the doctrine is contested by scholars and tribunals 
adjudicating on investment disputes.  Furthermore the matter is made more complicated by 
the fact that tribunals expressly state that while states are entitled to regulate affairs within 
their territory, including foreign investment, this is subject to limitations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
118 Ibid, para 423 
119 Ibid, para 424 
30 
 
Chapter 3 
Distinguishing between Indirect and Regulatory Expropriation 
  
There has not been any cohesive body of jurisprudence from investment tribunals that 
provides a set of criteria to draw a clear dividing line between indirect expropriation and 
regulatory expropriation in international investment law.120  Instead, Schefer writes that 
tribunals will be less reliant on ‘rigorous theoretical analysis’ than on their own views on 
the limits of state power.121  She also suggests that there are certain issues which will be 
given attention by tribunals in making their decision,122 but that they will have to decide 
for themselves where to place emphasis when making a finding of expropriation or 
regulation.123  It should be noted that there are competing arguments surrounding what 
factors will be determinate of a finding of indirect expropriation.  However in identifying 
whether there has been an indirect expropriation, as Nikiema writes, tribunals have been 
found to have used three particular approaches: (i) look to establish a detrimental effect; 
(ii) consider the legitimacy of the public interest of a measure; or (iii) assess the 
proportionality of a measure.124   
 
1. Detrimental effect 
 
In investment disputes, the detrimental effect criterion is sometimes known as the “sole 
effect doctrine”,125 where the tribunals must be satisfied that a state measure has caused 
“…serious and irreversible damage to the investment”126 before it will be deemed to be 
indirect expropriation.  When tribunals use the sole effect doctrine, only the effects of a 
state measure on the investor’s control over the profits from its investment matter and not 
the intentions of the state.127  In practice, the sole effect doctrine, is composed of two 
equally important facets – severity and irreversibility.128   In establishing the seriousness of 
the damage to an investment, the traditional test that must be established is that “…the 
                                                          
120 OECD, supra n12, p3  
121 Schefer, supra n18, p208.  It has also been noted that “…indirect expropriation jurisprudence and state 
practice reveal competing doctrinal strains, some that tend to favour the interests of foreign property owners, 
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122 Ibid, pp205-208 
123 Ibid, p208  
124 Nikiema, supra n68, p13 
125 See R.Dolzer, ‘Indirect Expropriation, New Developments?’, (2002-2003) N.Y.U.Envtl.L. J, Vol.11, p79 
126 Nikiema, supra n68, p14 
127 Schefer, supra n18, pp208-9 
128 Nikiema, supra n68, p14.  See also Pope and Talbot Inc v Canada, Interim Award, 26 June 2000, para 
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rights held over the investment have lost all economic interest for the investor”.129   
Nikiema notes that this will not be the case where an investor retains a free choice in 
company strategy and day-to-day management; has access to the profits generated from an 
investment; or has the freedom to come and go as they please.130  In Tokios Tokeles v 
Ukraine the tribunal stated that: 
 
A critical factor in the analysis of an expropriation claim is the extent of harm 
caused by the government’s actions.  For any expropriation – direct or indirect – to 
occur, the state must deprive the investor of a “substantial” part of the value of the 
investment.  Although neither the relevant treaty text nor existing jurisprudence 
have clarified the precise degree of deprivation that will qualify as “substantial, one 
can reasonably infer that a diminution of 5% of the investment’s value will not be 
enough for a finding of expropriation, while a diminution of 95% would likely be 
sufficient.131 
 
In establishing the irreversible nature of a state measure under the sole effects doctrine, 
tribunals must have evidence that the damage caused is “…not merely ephemeral”132 or is 
a “…deprivation […]enduring”.133  As noted by the tribunal in the case of LG&E v 
Argentina: 
 
The expropriation must be permanent, that is to say, it cannot have a temporary 
nature.134 
 
This approach was followed in the case of Tippetts v Iran.135  The claimant, Tippetts, 
Abbot, McCarthy, Stratton (TAMS) was an American engineering and architectural 
consulting partnership.  TAMS and an Iranian engineering firm, Aziz Farmanfarmanian 
and Associates (AFFA), created and held 50% ownership interest each in TAMS-AFFA, 
                                                          
129 Ibid.  See also Starrett Housing Corporation, Starrett Systems, Inc., Starrett Housing International, Inv., v 
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n68, p14 
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an Iranian organisation created to perform engineering and architectural services on the 
Tehran International Airport (TIA) project.  TAMS-AFFA operated on the principle of 
joint control until 1979 and any decisions that were made required the consent of at least 
one member appointed by each organisation.  The TIA project was based on a contract 
entered into on 19 March 1975 between TAMS and AFFA and the Civil Aviation 
Organization (CAO).  However, as a result of the Iranian Revolution, work the airport 
stopped from December 1978 to January 1979.  The Iranian Government in attempting to 
protect domestic industries, appointed a temporary manager for TAMS-AFFA, who was 
granted power to make decisions without the need to consult with TAMS.  Furthermore as 
a result of political instability, TAMS representatives were forced to leave the country and 
attempt to maintain their operation in respects of the TIA from the United States.  However 
despite several attempts of TAMS officials to contact TAMS-AFFA regarding these 
commitments, no reply was given.  The claimant then brought a claim before an Iran-US 
Claims tribunal alleging expropriation.  The tribunal, in finding that an indirect 
expropriation had taken place, provided the following as bases for its reasoning: 
 
While assumption of control over property by a government does not automatically 
and immediately justify a conclusion that the property has been taken by the 
government, thus requiring compensation under international law, such a 
conclusion is warranted whenever events demonstrate that the owner has been 
deprived of fundamental rights of ownership…The intent of the government is less 
important than the effects of the measure on the owner, and the form of the 
measures of control or interference is less important than the reality of their 
impact.136  
 
This ruling only reaffirms the rationale of the ‘sole effects’ doctrine.  The tribunal makes 
clear that a state measure that is sufficiently severe to deprive an investor of ownership 
rights will attract the need for compensation.  Regardless as to the intentions of the state in 
taking the action that it did, the damage suffered by the investors was deemed to be of such 
severity that there was a need for compensation to be provided. 
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Another example of the sole effect doctrine’s application, was the case of AES v 
Hungary.137  The dispute arose out of AES’ US $130 million investment in Tsiza II and 
other Hungarian power stations in 1996, at a time when Hungary was privatising parts of 
its energy sector.  A Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) between AES and Hungary 
established a pricing formula to be applied when Hungary ceased to oversee energy 
generation prices.  However, in reaction to public outrage over the allegedly high profits of 
public utility companies, Hungary enacted price decrees in 2006 and 2007, restoring the 
administrative pricing regime.  The return of administered prices caused AES significant 
losses of revenue, prompting the company to seek compensation through ICSID arbitration 
under the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT).138  AES argued, amongst other things, that 
Hungary had violated its obligation not to expropriate the property of AES.  In dealing 
with the claim that an indirect expropriation had taken place, the tribunal said: 
 
It is evident that many of the state’s acts or measures can affect investments and a 
modification to an existing law or regulation is probably one of the most common 
of such acts or measures.  Nevertheless, a state’s act that has a negative effect on an 
investment cannot automatically be considered an expropriation.  For an 
expropriation to occur, it is necessary for an investor to be deprived, in whole or in 
significant part, of the property or in effective control of its investment: or for its 
investment to be deprived, in whole or in significant part, of its investment.  But in 
this case, the amendment of the 2001 Electricity Act and the issuance of the Price 
Decrees did not interfere with the ownership or use of the Claimants’ property.139 
 
This finding is helpful in demonstrating the severity and duration with which a government 
measure, under the sole effect doctrine, must be before there will be a finding of 
expropriation.  
 
A final example of support in case-law for use of the ‘sole effects’ doctrine in deciding on 
a dispute was in the case of BG Group Plc v Argentina.140  BG Group was a UK firm that 
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was part of a consortium which held a majority stake in MetroGas.  MetroGas was an 
Argentinian business that held exclusive rights to distribute natural gas in Buenos Aires.  
At the time of BG Groups investment in the operation, Argentinian law provided that 
“tariffs” would be calculated in US dollars and would be set at levels to ensure a 
reasonable rate of return.  However Argentina later changed this law providing that the 
tariffs be measured in pesos.  This had a negative impact in MetroGas’ profits.  The case 
was eventually brought before an international tribunal where BG Group claimed that there 
investment had been expropriated.  In deciding on the dispute and that no expropriation 
had taken place the tribunal stated: 
 
The Tribunal notes that a State may exercise its sovereign power in issuing 
regulatory measures affecting private property for the benefit of public welfare.  
Compensation for expropriation is required if the measure adopted by the State is 
irreversible and permanent and if the assets or rights subject to such measure have 
been affected in such a way that…any form of exploitation thereof…has 
disappeared.141  
 
The tribunal ruled that based on the facts of the dispute, there was no such evidence that 
the claimant had been so deprived of its investment.  This ruling simply reiterates the 
approach taken by other tribunals, identifying that “…irreversible and permanent…” harm 
must be suffered by an investment, before an indirect expropriation is deemed to have 
taken place.  While there is clear evidence of the popularity of the use of the sole effects 
doctrine, there were some that questioned its utility.   
 
2. Legitimacy of the public interest 
 
The usefulness of the ‘sole effects’ doctrine has been criticised as being insufficient to 
identify instances of indirect expropriation when “legitimate” public regulations are the 
subject of a dispute and could result in any state measure that has a detrimental effect on an 
investor being deemed indirect expropriation.142  As a result, as an alternative, it has been 
                                                          
141 Ibid, para 268 
142 Nikiema, supra n68, p15.  See also Kriebaum, supra n75, p725 
35 
 
noted that tribunals have applied the ‘legitimate objective’ criterion in distinguishing 
between indirect expropriation and regulatory expropriation by state’s.143 
 
The assessment of the legitimacy of state action in claims of indirect expropriation is also 
known as the ‘purpose’ doctrine.144  It has been acknowledged that this test has multiple 
applications.145  However, all of these applications are said to revolve around the idea that 
“…certain legitimate host State measures with specific characteristics cannot be considered 
as indirect expropriations, even where they are seriously and irreversibly detrimental to an 
investment”.146  These measures are commonly referred to as ‘police powers’.147 Fortier et 
al suggest that the frequent use of the ‘purpose’ doctrine by tribunals indicates the need for 
a contextual analysis to be undertaken in determining claims of expropriation.148 
 
There is no definitive listing of what state measures will always be held to be ‘police 
powers’ or sufficiently legitimate and non-compensable.149  This has caused some tribunals 
to take the view that, “…a blanket exception for regulatory measures would create a 
gaping loophole in international protection against expropriation”.150  Furthermore some 
tribunals have explicitly questioned the viability of the non-compensable status of state 
regulations, as in Azurix v Argentina.151  Azurix Corporation, was a US organisation, that 
took part in the privatisation of water services in the Argentinian Province of Buenos 
Aires.  In July 1999, Azurix Buenos Aires (ABA), an Argentinian indirect subsidiary of 
Azurix, won a privatization tender and was granted a 30-year concession for the 
distribution of portable water, and the treatment and disposal of sewerage in the Province.  
ABA made a “canon payment” of 438.5 million Argentine pesos for the Concession.  A 
new regulatory authority (“ORAB”) was established to oversee and regulate the 
Concession.   
 
                                                          
143 Ibid, p17.  See also Dolzer and Schreuer, supra n1, p300 where the authors discuss how the ‘purpose’ that 
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Under the Concession agreement, the Province was obliged to complete certain 
infrastructure repairs before Azurix would take over the water concession.  However, the 
Province never completed the necessary repairs.  As a result, in April 2000 an algae 
outbreak occurred, damaging Azurix’s investment as a water provider. Azurix claimed that 
provincial health authorities bore responsibility for this and for encouraging the public not 
to pay their water bills, damaging Azurix’s investment. Azurix brought an arbitral dispute 
before the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, alleging amongst 
other things, that Argentina’s actions resulted in an expropriation of its investment.  Whilst 
the tribunal did not rule that Argentina’s action resulted in an expropriation, it did state that 
it found the criterion of the purpose of a regulatory measure insufficient to excuse a State 
from the needs to compensate an investor152 and contradictory: 
 
According to it, the BIT would require that investments not be expropriated for a 
public purpose and that there be compensation if such expropriation takes place 
and, at the same time, regulatory measures that may be tantamount to expropriation 
would not give rise to a claim for compensation if taken for a public purpose.153 
 
The tribunal also referred to the work of Rosalyn Higgins, subsequently a judge and 
President of the International Court of Justice, who voiced concerns regarding whether the 
difference between indirect expropriation and regulatory expropriation based on public 
purpose alone, was intellectually viable: 
 
Is this distinction intellectually valid?  Is not the State in both cases (that is, either 
by taking for a public purpose, or by regulating) purporting to act in the common 
good?  And in each case has the owner of the property not suffered loss?  Under 
international law standards, a regulation that amounted (by virtue of its scope and 
effect) to a taking, would need to be ‘for a public purpose’ (in the sense of the 
general, rather than for the private interest).  And just compensation would be 
due.154 
 
Despite these concerns as to the rigour of the ‘purpose’ test in distinguishing indirect 
expropriation from regulatory expropriation, as Fortier et al note, the ‘purpose’ doctrine 
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has been incorporated into several international trade and investment agreements, all of 
which preserve the non-compensable pursuance of legitimate public welfare objectives 
from being deemed as expropriation.155   
 
The tribunal in Azurix v Argentina commented that, “…the public purpose criterion as an 
additional criterion to the effect of the measures under consideration needs to be 
complemented”.156  The discussion above demonstrates that the purpose of a state measure 
has not been universally accepted as a criterion to excuse state’s from compensation.  As in 
Azurix, there has been a call for a more contextual analysis of the nature of the measures 
taken by state’s against investors in pursuing a public purpose, and for proportionality to 
play a greater role in decisions taken when investment tribunals are reviewing regulatory 
measures taken by the host state.157 
 
3. Proportionality 
 
The principle of proportionality is a relatively recent addition to the calculus of 
international investment dispute resolution.158  It has been described as consisting of, 
“…the weighing [of] both the purpose and effect of a measure in a sort of regulation/ 
expropriation balance”.159  This approach is said to require that, 
 
The higher the purpose of a measure and the greater its practical benefit to the 
public welfare, the greater is the level of investment interference that must be 
demonstrated in order to tip the scale towards a characterization of the measure as 
an expropriation.160   
 
A useful example of the use of proportionality in deciding an investment dispute was in the 
case of Tecmed v Mexico.161  Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed was incorporated in 
Spain.  In 1996, its Mexican subsidiary Cytrar bought property, buildings, facilities, and 
other assets for a controlled landfill for hazardeous industrial waste.   
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In the following years, the municipal administration was hostile to the landfill project.  The 
federal government also refused to renew Tecmed’s operating licence, citing breaches in 
the operational aspects of the landfill.  Tecmed, convinced that the new local government’s 
ideology, rather than legal issues, were the cause of the withdrawl of the licence, brought a 
claim to arbitration for compensation for indirect expropriations and measures ‘tantamount 
to nationalization or expropriation’.  Tecmed claimed that the local population had been 
incited to protest against the landfill and to close it down.  In assessing Tecmed’s claim, 
the Tribunal stated that it will consider: 
 
…in order to determine if they are to be characterized as expropriatory [if 
regulatory actions and measures] are to be characterised as expropriatory, whether 
such actions or measures are proportional to the public interest presumably 
protected thereby and to the protection legally granted to investments, taking into 
account that the significance of [a measure’s negative financial impact on the 
investment] has a key role upon deciding the proportionality…162 
 
The tribunal considered three things in its decision making; whether or not the damage 
suffered was substantial; whether there was a public interest in existence; and whether the 
state’s response was necessary to achieve the public interest.163  In assessing whether the 
damage suffered was substantial, the tribunal in Tecmed found that the Resolution 
provided for the non-renewal of the permit in question and the closing of the landfill – 
destroying Cyrtars interests in the landfill.164 The tribunal did note that there was a degree 
of community or political pressure against the Landfill, establishing some measure of a 
public interest.165  However, the tribunal found that the “…absence of any evidence that 
the operation of the Landfill was a real or potential threat to the environment or public 
health, coupled with an absence of massive opposition”166 did not constitute justification 
enough to expropriate Tecmed’s property, and its being excused from the need to 
compensate. 
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The proportionality approach has been praised as being more balanced than the sole effect 
doctrine,167 and is also arguably more so than the ‘purpose’ doctrine,168 in that it 
contributes to a more robust decision making process.169  It is suggested that in attempting 
to replace the ‘sole effect’ and ‘purpose’ doctrine in investment disputes, the 
proportionality approach actually incorporates and employs them in its use.  As Olynyk 
writes on the merit of a ‘balanced approach’ to adjudicating investment disputes: 
 
While both of these doctrines [‘sole effect’ and ‘purpose’] would incidentally 
provide a surer method of predicting the outcome of an investor-State dispute over 
a potential regulatory expropriation, both of these doctrines leave either the investor 
or the State in a superior position.  A better approach is to adopt neither doctrine, 
but incorporate the principles from both into a balanced…analysis determined by 
all the relevant factors.170   
 
The proportionality approach focuses the examination of the adjudicators on the effect and 
purpose of a State measure, and employs them as component parts to be included in a 
wider analysis, allowing for a “…complete analysis of a potential expropriation …”.171  
However, some voiced concerns over its being used to resolve investment disputes.172  As 
traditionally understood, the proportionality approach was developed outwith the field of 
international investment law,173 and was built around a system of legal processes which 
provided for certain frameworks.  However these frameworks are not easily transposable 
within international investment law as it is made up of a complex network of BITs.174  
Moreover, its suitability has been said to be even more questionable the context of modern 
international investment law where, unlike in other regimes, there is no right to appeal to a 
decision of private individuals.175 
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As has been discussed, there is no universally accepted set of guidelines, distinguishing 
indirect expropriation from state regulatory expropriation.   It appears that investment 
tribunal decisions will be more reliant on individuals than on doctrinal theories.  From the 
discussion above it is clear that three competing approaches have arisen in terms of dealing 
with claims of indirect expropriation.  The ‘sole effect’ and ‘purpose’ doctrines require 
investment tribunals to conduct their inquiries in a relatively simplistic manner: focus 
either on the effect of a state measure on an investment, or focus on the purpose that a 
measure is alleged to serve.  The third approach based on proportionality, is multi-faceted 
and requires tribunals to conduct a balancing exercise between investors and states’ rights.  
Given that the proportionality based approach is deemed to have overcome the flaws held 
by the two earlier approaches used by tribunals in investment law disputes, a more detailed 
discussion on its contents and use is called for.   
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Chapter 4 
Exploring Proportionality in International Investment law 
 
The utility of the employment of the proportionality approach has been the subject of 
increased debate in international investment law.176 Its use has been advocated by a 
number of investment tribunals.  As in the case of LG&E v Argentina, the tribunal stated 
that: 
 
In order to establish whether State measures constitute expropriation…the Tribunal 
must balance two competing interests: the degree of the measure’s interference 
with the right of ownership and the power of the State to adopt its policies…With 
respect to the power of the State to adopt its policies, it can generally be said that 
the State has the right to adopt measures having a social or general welfare purpose.  
In such a case, the measure must be accepted without the imposition of liability, 
except in cases where the State’s action is obviously disproportionate to the need 
being addressed.177 
 
Similarly in the case of Azurix v Argentina, the Tribunal stated that there had to be: 
 
a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the 
aim sought to be realized”. This proportionality will not be found if the person 
concerned bears “an individual and excessive burden… such a measure must be 
both appropriate for achieving its aim and not disproportionate thereto.178 
 
Furthermore many commentators write favourably of the use of the proportionality 
approach in adjudicating international investment disputes.  Han writes that the principle of 
proportionality is a “…neutral concept”179 which is designed to “…deal with the 
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relationship between end and means, and demands an appropriate relationship between 
them”.180 Henckels notes that the use of proportionality in deciding on international 
investment law disputes provides “…greater policy space for host states to take measures 
in the public interest, yet would provide sufficient scrutiny to control misuse of public 
power”.181  Essentially the principle of proportionality involves a bringing together of the 
two approaches mentioned above: Detrimental Effect and Legitimacy, which are then 
weighed against one another so to establish whether the end result justifies the means 
employed.    
 
Tecmed v Mexico182 is sometimes identified as the first dispute which saw a proportionality 
based approach used by an investment tribunal in deciding on a claim of indirect 
expropriation.183   (Henckels writes that Tecmed v Mexico is the only case to have 
elaborated on what a proportionality analysis by investment tribunals actually involves.184) 
The facts of the case were discussed earlier, and do not merit reproduction here.  Turning 
to the ruling of the tribunal, following its analysis of the facts surrounding the dispute, the 
tribunal set out the first step in applying the proportionality approach to the case:  
 
it is understood that the measures adopted by a State, whether regulatory or not, are 
an indirect de facto expropriation if they are irreversible and permanent and if the 
assets or rights subject to such measure have been affected in such a way that 
“…any form of exploitation thereof…” has disappeared; i.e. the economic value of 
the use, enjoyment or disposition of the assets or rights affected by the 
administrative action or decision have been neutralized or destroyed.  Under 
international law, the owner is also deprived of property where the use or 
enjoyment of benefits related thereto is exacted or interfered with to a similar 
extent, even where legal ownership over the assets in question is not affected, and 
so long as the deprivation is not temporary.185 
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At first glance it seems the tribunal is applying what would ordinarily have been 
considered the ‘sole effects’ approach.186  It states that the test that must be satisfied is that 
the harm suffered by a foreign investor be sufficiently substantial to result in the economic 
value of an investment being removed.   
   
On closer inspection, however, things are not as simple as that.  In Tecmed v Mexico the 
tribunal also invokes the idea of a bona fide public interest.  It states:  
 
[the purpose of this judgement is to]…examine whether the Resolution violates the 
Agreement in lights of its provisions and of international law.  The Arbitral 
Tribunal will not review the grounds or motives of the Resolution in order to 
determine whether it could be or was legally issued.  However it must consider 
such matters to determine if the Agreement was violated.  That the actions of the 
Respondent are legitimate or lawful or in compliance with the law of the 
Respondent’s domestic laws does not mean that they conform to the Agreement or 
to international law.187 
 
In conducting its analysis of the legitimacy of state actions the tribunal thus reaffirms that 
the ‘wrong’ in question must be committed on the international plane.   This is very similar 
to what would have been considered the ‘legitimacy approach’ discussed earlier.  The key 
difference, however, is that after reviewing this question the tribunal immediately moves 
on to consider whether the state measures were necessary to achieve the respective public 
interest in question, or in other words, whether they were proportionate:   
 
Although the analysis starts at the due deference owing to the State when defining 
the issues that affect its public policy or the interests of society as a whole, as well 
as the actions that will be implemented to protect such values, such situation does 
not prevent the Arbitral Tribunal, without thereby questioning such due deference 
from examining the actions of the State in light of Article 5(1) of the Agreement to 
determine whether such measures are reasonable with respect to their goals, the 
deprivation of economic rights  and the legitimate expectations of those who 
suffered such deprivation. There must be a reasonable relationship of 
                                                          
186 Nikiema, supra n68, p16 
187 Tecmed v Mexico, supra n94, para 120 
44 
 
proportionality between the charge or weight imposed to the foreign investor and 
the aim sought to be realized by any expropriatory measure.188 
 
It is true that the proportionality approach could be regarded as a more sophisticated test in 
distinguishing indirect expropriation from regulatory expropriation.  Its use by tribunals 
involves a multifaceted analysis of the facts of a case before it can decide on whether or 
not state action is expropriatory or not.    
 
Nikiema notes that at this point the tribunal essentially suggests that the applicable test 
ought to be that: 
 
[for]…the authorities response [to] be necessary to achieve the intended public 
interest[,]…the measure taken by the State has to be the only measure available, to 
achieve the objective, or the least detrimental if a number of effective solutions 
exist.189 
 
Put differently, to determine whether or not the examined scenario falls under the rubric of 
indirect expropriation or regulatory expropriation the Tecmed approach proposes to 
examine (i) the severity of the damage done to an investment, (ii) the legitimacy of the 
public interest which a State claims to be protecting, and (iii) whether the measures 
pursued by the State where ‘reasonably proportionate’ vis-a-vis  that end, in the sense that 
the charge or weight imposed on the foreign investor must correlate appropriately with the 
motivating purpose. 
 
Henckels writes that while the use of this approach is becoming increasingly common in 
investment disputes, the popularity of the use of a proportionality based approach by 
investment tribunals should not be overstated.190  She goes on to note that: 
 
The use of the technique remains patchy and inconsistently applied, both within the 
context of a particular tribunal decision (tribunals employing the technique in 
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relation to the same measures but not others), and in relation to different cases 
decided on the same facts.191 
 
This view is shared by other commentators in the field.  Thus Fan for example writes that 
the principle of proportionality has no substantial content in and of itself.192  Furthermore, 
Han goes on to note,“…the principle has different applications in different fields, and its 
content depends on the context”.193 
 
A similar observation is also made by Tarcisio Gazzini: 
 
If the introduction of the proportionality test must be welcome, the application of 
the test remains rudimental and inaccurate…[I]t is difficult to compare the aim of 
the measure(s) with the charge imposed on the foreign investor.  This may work in 
the field of human rights where tribunals are used and allowed to strike a balance 
between the general interest and the protection of the individual while recognizing 
a wide margin of discretion to States.  The transposition to foreign investment of 
this approach seems rather problematic.194 
 
The same skeptical note can also be found in the writings of Simon Baughen, who 
similarly questions the usefulness of proportionality in deciding on claims of 
expropriation.195  Commenting on Tecmed and its claim that the concept of proportionality 
adopted in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights could be useful in 
adjudicating investment disputes Baughen writes: 
 
…under the ECHR jurisprudence…a deprivation of possessions, which equates to 
an expropriation under customary international law, will rarely, if at all, be 
proportional in the absence of compensation.  In contrast, a measure that affects a 
control of use will often be proportional in the absence of compensation, but such 
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claims would not constitute expropriations under customary international law, 
because of the absence of the requisite severity of the impact on the investment.  It 
must therefore be doubted whether the concept has any role to play in developing 
the jurisprudence of customary international law as to what State conduct 
constitutes an expropriation.196 
 
A profound substantive discontent, in other words, exists between the theories of 
proportionality developed under the ECHR system and the traditional assumptions of 
international investment law.  To transplant the former into an investigate framework 
structured by the latter is while novel, a dubious proposition. 
 
Nor is this all.  As Gazzini points out: 
 
The proportionality test as elaborated by the ECHR, moreover seems inappropriate 
in respect of measures affecting a plurality of subjects.  In this case, proportionality 
must be applied taking into account inter alia the global impact of the measures for 
two reasons.  First, the test will not only produce a partial and misleading result, but 
also make it extremely difficult – if not impossible – to prove a case of indirect 
expropriation.  Second, since the impact of regulatory measures on different 
investors may be different, the individual application of the proportionality test is 
likely to lead to inconsistent outcomes.197 
 
The apparent appetite for the use of proportionality in modern practice seems to be in-
keeping with, as Kennedy notes, “…a global trend in legal thought” to incorporate 
proportionality into legal decision making.198  However doubts concerning the applicability 
of proportionality to the adjudication of investment disputes are not without merit.  Taking 
into consideration the work of scholars mentioned, it would be appropriate to note the 
observation made by Kennedy in his discussion of the evolution of the proportionality 
discourse in legal reasoning that: 
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…the move to proportionality represents the simultaneous de-rationalisation and 
politicisation of legal technique…[and] is open to radically different 
interpretations.199   
 
Kennedy notes the attractiveness of the ideal of proportionality in legal decision making by 
tracing its close relationship with the idea of balancing exercises: 
 
…We balance when there is a gap, or conflict or ambiguity in legal materials, so 
that it is at least arguable that there is neither a definitive ‘concept’ nor a definitive 
teleological nor a definitive precedential answer to the interpretative question 
posed…In balancing, we understand ourselves to be choosing a norm (not choosing 
a winning party) among a number of permissible alternatives on the ground that it 
best balances or combines normative conflicting considerations…200 
 
When they apply the principle of proportionality in international investment law, tribunals 
engage typically in a balancing exercise aimed to resolve a conflict in legal materials or 
rights: the rights of investors to the protection of their property against the rights of the 
host  state to exercise its regulatory sovereignty within its territory.  The problem with this 
setup, however, is that balancing is a notoriously open-ended exercise: there is nothing in 
the idea of proportionality that helps either the investor or the host state gain a clearer 
understanding of how exactly any given dispute is going to turn out.  The logic of 
balancing in other words, does not allow for any greater degree of certainty in the 
determination of the legal boundary between indirect and regulatory expropriation.   
 
From the aforegoing discussion, it seems clear that there are conflicting views on how 
suitable the approach will be in distinguishing between indirect expropriation and 
regulatory expropriation.  Ultimately, in addressing claims of indirect expropriation by 
states, one would hope that the tests used by tribunals to distinguish between the two 
practices are sufficiently clear and precise.  A close examination of the matter, however, 
indicates that such hopes may be rather misplaced.  
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i. Severity of damage to an investment 
 
As demonstrated in Tecmed v Mexico, a tribunal that seeks to apply the proportionality 
approach to an investment dispute, must first consider the level of damage that has been 
done to an investment.201   
 
Demonstrating the level of seriousness of damage that an investment has suffered before it 
is deemed as having been indirectly expropriated is difficult.  In the first instance it is quite 
clear that the categorisation of a state measure as ‘harmful’ to an investment is 
indeterminate, and says little of the meaning of this criterion in practice.  Tribunals have 
long recognised this fact and have attempted to provide clarity on the substance of this 
criterion of the proportionality approach to dealing with investment disputes.  However 
their success has been limited.   In his review of the decisions of many investment tribunals 
on the level of harm that must be done to an investment before it is identified as having 
been expropriated, Gazzini notes that “…Tribunals have adopted similar but by no means 
equivalent tests…”202  A review of international investment law jurisprudence 
demonstrates the variety of tests that the tribunals have employed in addressing the harm 
done to an investment.   
 
Thus in CMS Gas Transmission Company v Argentina,203 the tribunal stated that the test 
was whether or not there is evidence that “…substantial deprivation”204 has been suffered 
by investors.  The difficulty is that this test is not sufficient in and of itself, in that the 
tribunal does not demonstrate what a ‘substantial deprivation’ involves.  Rather the 
tribunal must involve other criteria to give meaning to this test in that a ‘substantial 
deprivation’ will only have occurred where (i) the investor is not in control of the 
investment, (ii) the Government controls the day-to-day operations of the company, (iii) 
company employees are under arrest, (iv) the payment of dividends by the company is 
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interfered with, (vii) directors or the senior management are not appointed by the company, 
or (viii) the investor does not have full control or ownership of their investment.205 
 
A different test was followed in the case of Pope & Talbot Inc. v Canada.206  There the 
tribunal ruled that inasmuch as there was no evidence to demonstrate that there had been 
an interference “…substantial enough” the impact of the government measure in question 
could not be deemed as expropriatory.207 The tribunal did not clarify what the concept of 
‘substantial enough’ interference actually means in practice, other than to agree that based 
on the arguments of the Respondent that this level of interference had not been proven in 
the present case. 
 
By contrast in the case of Tippets v Iran208 the threshold argument was articulated in terms 
of ownership rights.  The tribunal held that expropriation will occur: 
 
…whenever events demonstrate that the owner was deprived of fundamental rights 
of ownership and it appears that this deprivation is not merely ephemeral.209   
 
The difficulty with this ruling is that this test does not specify which particular rights have 
to be affected for the threshold to be crossed.  Furthermore it also fails to explain what 
timeframe has to be borne in mind for when government interference would, or would not 
be “…merely ephemeral”.  The fact of the matter is that both of these two components of 
the test are vague and there is considerable scope for interpretative contestation.  
 
In Starrett Housing v Iran210 a different test was employed altogether: in determining 
whether the damage suffered by the investor should be considered severe enough the 
tribunal stated that an expropriation will only have occurred where property rights “…are 
rendered so useless that they must be deemed to have been expropriated”.211  Arguably this 
test is somewhat more definitive than that which has been formulated by other tribunals in 
that it requires adjudicators to look for what would be typical of a case of direct 
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expropriation.  However it is perhaps too severe a test in attempting to negotiate the 
apparent differences between indirect expropriation and regulatory expropriation.  
Furthermore the term “…so useless” is not particularly helpful in that it invites one to form 
a view depending on whether or not they view this aspect of the test as an absolute or a 
matter of degree, and begs the question as to when investors rights are robbed of any 
utility.  This question is also subject to competing but equally valid answers.   
 
In an even more bizarre turn of reasoning, in LG&E v Argentina212 the deciding factor in 
determining the severity of the damage suffered by the protected investment was defined in 
even more circular terms: 
 
…[for] the economic impact unleashed by the measure adopted by the host State 
[to be] sufficiently severe as to generate the need for compensation due to 
expropriation…the impact must be substantial in order that that compensation may 
be claimed for the expropriation.213  
 
The lack of clarity with regard to what precisely constitutes the test for determining 
whether the severity of damage to an investment should be considered expropriatory or 
regulatory, is not limited international investment law jurisprudence, but can also be found 
in the writings of scholars and publicists.  In his analysis of the scholarly literature in 
international investment law, Mostafa notes that there are various descriptions of the 
threshold that must be reached before a state measures impact on an investment is deemed 
to be expropriatory.214  Gudofsky writes that a state measure must result in foreign investor 
suffering “…a significant loss over the use and/or enjoyment of his or her property” before 
it can be deemed as expropriatory.215 Mapp on the other hand writes that a measure must 
be such that it “…renders property “virtually valueless”” before it could be vulnerable to a 
finding of being expropriatory.216  Wortley offers a completely different idea of how severe 
                                                          
212 LG&E v Argentina, supra n133 
213 Ibid, para 191 
214 B. Mostafa, ‘The Sole Effects Doctrine, Police Powers and Indirect Expropriation under International 
Law’ (2008) Austl. Int’l L. J, Vol.15, pp279-280 
215 J. Gudofsky, “Shedding Light on Article 1110 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
Concerning Expropriations: An Environmental Case Study” (2000-2001) Northwestern Journal of 
International Law and Business, Vol.21, p258. 
216 W. Mapp, The Iran-US Claims Tribunal : The First Ten Years (1993) p155, cited in J. Wagner, 
“International Investment, Expropriation and Environmental Protection” (1999) Golden Gate University 
Law Review, Vol.29, pp522-523.  Available at http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol29/iss3/6  
51 
 
damage to an investment must be before it can be deemed expropriatory in that it 
“…become[s] equivalent to the [direct] expropriation of a property right”.217 
 
A modest foray into international investment law jurisprudence demonstrates the variety of 
tests that tribunals have employed in establishing the severity of damage suffered by 
investors.  However attempts by investment tribunals and scholars to clarify the level of 
damage that must be suffered by an investment have so far had limited success.  Their 
efforts have resulted in an incoherent body of case law, which has resulted in this criterion 
of the proportionality approach to be no less indeterminate than when it was created.  A 
lacking in certainty on the requisite level of damage that is required before an investment is 
deemed as having been expropriated represents a significant problem for both investors 
and tribunals.  Investors may be faced with the prospect of having to argue a claim of 
indirect expropriation but not knowing the relevant threshold they have to demonstrate to 
the tribunal.  Furthermore tribunal members will not know how to apply their minds to the 
facts that are presented to them - they will not be equipped with the necessary tools to 
establish whether or not an expropriation has occurred.  Wortley goes on to note that the 
“…uncertainty concerning the threshold of seriousness of the adverse effect of the 
measure(s) upon the foreign investor represents a serious problem”.218 
 
ii. Legitimacy of the Public Interest 
 
Establishing the legitimacy of a public interest which is claimed to be the motivating factor 
for a state’s actions, is difficult.219  Historically some scholars have questioned whether an 
international court or tribunal should have any part to play in determining the legitimacy of 
state regulatory conduct.  As Sornarajah notes : 
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[T]he inquiry into the motives behind the taking of foreign property, especially by a 
foreign court or tribunal, would be a task that would not only involve an affront to 
the sovereignty of the nationalizing state but would lead to charges of prejudice 
against a tribunal which makes the decision.220 
 
In adjudicating on investment disputes tribunals have been reluctant to engage in any 
analysis on the motivations behind state regulatory measures.221  However the only reason 
that a tribunal will question the legitimacy of the purpose of a state’s regulatory measure is 
to ensure that it is acceptable under international, not national law. In most investment 
disputes where a state claims that it was pursuing bona fide regulation, arguments about 
the use of regulatory or ‘police powers’ tend to arise.  Many tribunals have ruled that in 
principle state actions that are regulatory in nature are exempt from the need to compensate 
investors.  What exactly should be included under this rubric, however, remains unclear.  
As the tribunal in SD Myers v Canada222 noted: 
 
The general body of precedent usually does not treat regulatory action as 
amounting to expropriation.  Regulatory conduct by public authorities is unlikely to 
be the subject of legitimate complaint under Article 1110 of the NAFTA although 
the Tribunal does not rule out the possibility.223  
 
The tribunal in Saluka v Czech Republic224 made similar comments: 
 
In the opinion of the Tribunal, the principle that a State does not commit an 
expropriation and is thus not liable to pay compensation to a dispossessed alien 
investor when it adopts general regulations that are ‘commonly accepted as within 
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the police power of States’ forms part of customary international law today.  There 
is ample case law in support of this proposition.225 
 
This principle was also reiterated in the case of Continental Casualty v Argentina:226 
 
Limitations to the use of property in the public interest that fall within typical 
government regulations of property entailing mostly inevitable limitations imposed 
in order to ensure the rights of others or of the general public (being ultimately 
beneficial also to the property affected).  These restrictions do not impede the basic, 
typical use of a given asset and do not impose an unreasonable burden on the owner 
as compared with other similar situated property owners.  These restrictions are not 
therefore considered a form of expropriation and do not require indemnification, 
provided however that they do not affect property in an intolerable, discriminatory 
or disproportionate manner.227 
 
The criterion of ‘legitimacy’ in the context of investment law does not suffer from the 
same indeterminacy as the severity component of the proportionality approach.  As 
evidenced above, the question for a tribunal dealing with an investment dispute is whether 
or not a State has committed a wrong under international law: it must establish whether the 
purpose pursued by a state is acceptable under international law, and therefore in effect 
determine its legitimacy.  However the difficulty in using the ‘police powers’ of states as a 
criterion, as Atwood and Trebilcock note, that will either condemn or save a state’s actions 
and deem them as indirectly expropriatory or regulatory, is that there is conflicting 
evidence as to their substantive content. 228  Tribunals appear to have been inconsistent in 
applying this doctrine in practice. 
 
A brief reiteration of the findings of investment tribunals on the content of the ‘police 
powers’ doctrine, as was discussed earlier in this thesis, is merited.  Some tribunals notably 
Methanex v United States recognised environmental measures as being within the limits of 
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the ‘police powers’ doctrine,229 but failed to substantiate the ruling in discussing the 
parameters of the public purpose pursued.  Furthermore in cases like Santa Elena v Costa 
Rica,230 the tribunals showed little regard for the alleged purposes put forward by the host, 
and made clear that regardless of the motivating purpose of state measures the investor still 
required to be compensated.  This ruling was similar to that in Tecmed v Mexico231 where 
there was little doubt that measures taken with a view to protecting societal interests are 
not immediately excluded from the rule requiring investors to be compensated following 
their investments being damaged as a result.  Moreover in Metalclad v Mexico the tribunal 
stated that the motivation for the states employing environmental protection measures was 
irrelevant to its finding of an indirect expropriation.232  The tribunal in Link-Trading v 
Moldova held that the impact of a state’s taxation powers would not, in the circumstances 
merit compensation.233 However, the same tribunal did acknowledge that taxation can be 
of such severity that it would constitute expropriation.234  Furthermore while in cases like 
SD Myers v Canada the tribunal deemed state regulatory practices to be exempt from 
categorisation as expropriatory, in the case of Pope and Talbot v Canada235 the tribunal 
was very critical of the claim that regulatory ‘police power’ measures cannot be 
expropriatory.236  What is more, some tribunals have even gone so far as to say that there 
has never been any agreed definition of ‘police powers’ in international law.237 
 
It is clear from case-law that there are contradictory decisions being made by investment 
tribunals, and a lack of consensus on the substance of the ‘police power’ doctrine and 
regulatory expropriation.  The differing views expressed by tribunals on this topic do little 
more than present an incoherent body of decisions from which one cannot discern, with 
                                                          
229 Methanex v The United States, supra n71 
230 Compania del Desarrollo de Santa Elena, S.A. v Republic of Costa Rica ICSID Case No ARB/96/1, Final 
Award, 17 February 2000, para 72.  Available at http://italaw.com/documents/santaelena_award.pdf  
231 Tecmed v Mexico, supra n94 
232 Metalclad v Mexico, supra n55, para 111 
233 Link Trading v Moldova, supra n100, para 83,  
234 Ibid, paras 64-91 
235 Pope and Talbot v Canada, supra n128 
236 Ibid, para 99 where the Tribunal states “Canada appears to claim that, because the measures under 
consideration are cast in the form of regulation, they constitute an exercise of ‘police powers’, which, if non-
discriminatory, are supposedly beyond the reach of the NAFTA rules regarding expropriations.  While the 
exercise of ‘police powers’ must be analysed with special care, the Tribunal believes that Canada’s 
formulation goes too far.  Regulations can indeed be exercised in a way that would constitute creeping 
expropriation.” 
237 See American International Group, Inc. and American Life Insurance Company v Islamic Republic of 
Iran and Central Insurance of Iran, Iran-US CT Award No 93-2-3, 19 December 1983 at para 145 where the 
tribunal states that a “…precise definition of the ‘public purpose’ for which an expropriation may be lawfully 
decided had neither been agreed upon in international law nor even suggested.”. 
55 
 
any degree of certainty what the content of the ‘police powers’ doctrine is.  This view is 
held also by the scholarly authorities.  Thus Mostafa writes “…the precise scope and 
meaning of the rule is notoriously uncertain”238 and has “…multiple formulations”.239 In 
their discussion on government regulation and expropriation, both Atwood and Trebilcok 
share the view that there does not “…appear to be any universally agreed set of principles 
as to when one government action should fall into one category and another in the 
other”.240 Mostafa goes on to note that: 
 
It should be accepted that the current state of customary international law, and 
indeed treaty law, in the field of foreign investment, is that States are free to 
determine what is in their public interest.  International investment law does not 
contain a hierarchy under which public purposes that are recognised by all States 
are legitimate, whilst only those invoked by some States are not.241 
 
From the discussion above it is clear that what is deemed to be in the public interest of 
states in pursuing regulatory measures, or exercising their ‘police powers’ is a 
fundamentally unsettled question.  Tribunals’ approach to dealing with the issue has been 
highly inconsistent, and scholarly opinion seems to be in keeping with this view. 
 
While there are concerns regarding the certainty of the substance of the doctrine of ‘police 
power’ in international investment law, some also question the very language used to 
create it.   Weston discusses the terminology of lawyers, both municipal and international, 
and is critical of the use of ambiguous descriptors of state actions as “regulatory” or “an 
exercise of the police power”.242  As he goes on to note: 
 
To aggrieved parties it is a small comfort that the action is “regulatory” or “an 
exercise of the police power.”  They have all lost in the same way.  As Edwin 
Borchard is reputed to have said, “[e]very man whose property rights are 
diminished thinks that there has been a ‘confiscation’ 243 
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An alternative to speaking about measures that are accepted as a bona fide use of ‘police 
powers’, is of state measures taken in the ‘public interest’.  However this alternative 
taxonomy provides little guidance for tribunals in attempting to resolve investment 
disputes when, as Choudhury writes, ‘public interest’ issues can be formulated in one of 
two ways 
 
First the public interest can be thoughts of in terms of the interest of the state and 
its constituents.  Thus for example, under takings jurisprudence, state takings may 
be exempt from liability if effectuated for a public purpose.  For the most part the 
state is given broad discretion to self-define its “public purpose” so long as it is 
rational and reasonable.  The discretion given to states to act for a public purpose is 
premised on the idea that the state will act in the best interests of the state and its 
citizens…The public interest can also implicate issues which encapsulate the 
common interest of mankind.  Examples of this include issues such as those raised 
by human rights or environmental concerns.  In this context, public interest may 
implicate the economists’ notion of public goods.  Economists define a public good 
as being non-rival and non-excludable.  Thus, the environment, drinking water, and 
many public services are all considered public goods.244 
 
Both of these competing, but equally valid, interpretations of the idea of public purposes 
are available to tribunals in deciding on investment disputes.  The availability of multiple 
meanings does not fit well with the task of finding an exclusionary criterion.  
 
iii. Necessity of the measure 
 
The last component of the proportionality analysis requires tribunals to consider whether or 
not the actions of the State were necessary in the circumstances giving rise to an 
investment dispute.  This is arguably the most difficult aspect of the proportionality 
approach for tribunals to deal with.  As has been noted in scholarly literature this 
component of the proportionality approach, where a tribunal will determine whether  
state’s actions are indirectly or regulatory expropriatory will consider“…by way of a 
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balancing process, all relevant circumstances”,245 has been applied in a contradictory 
manner by tribunals.   
 
Henckels notes that “…there is no single coherent approach to proportionality” but points 
out that in the context of investment disputes one approach does seem to have become 
popular where tribunals are required to employ “…a nested sequence of successively more 
stringent tests” in determining whether or not an impugned state measure will be deemed 
proportionate to its aim.246  Leonhardsen also notes this and speaks in greater detail on the 
substance of the necessity criterion: 
 
I mean here a judicial analysis consisting of three different elements: suitability, 
necessity and proportionality stricto senso, which must be assessed cumulatively. 
The first of these implies ‘whether the measure at issue is suitable or appropriate to 
achieve the objective it pursues.’ For a measure to be suitable the existence of ‘a 
causal relationship between the measure  and its object’  is required. For a measure 
to be  necessary  there  must  exist  no  alternative  measure  that  is  both  less  
restrictive  than  the measure  being  reviewed  and  equally  effective  in  achieving  
the  objective  pursued. This stage  of  the  analysis  exists  in  a  somewhat  uneasy  
relationship  with  the  notion  of  a  wide  margin of appreciation left to State 
parties by  international adjudicators, which sometimes seems  to  cause  them  to  
skip  this  stage  altogether,  as  appears  to  have  been  the  case  in  the award in 
the  Tecmed  case discussed below.247 
 
In terms of determining a measures’ proportionality stricto sensu, Leonhardsen refers to 
the work of Van den Bossche who, in a somewhat different though related context, states 
that this “…involves an assessment of whether the effects of a measure are 
disproportionate or excessive in relation to the interests involved”.248  Leonhardsen also 
notes the works of Adenas and Zepling in this respect, who write that in the context of 
resolving WTO disputes: 
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It is at this stage that a true weighing and balancing of competing objectives takes 
place.  The more intense the restriction of a particular interest, the more important 
the justification for the countervailing objective needs to be.249 
 
Despite the admirable efforts of scholars to point out the constituent parts of the necessity 
criterion to allow for its consistent application, tribunals appear to have adopted conflicting 
approaches to its application.   Despite being the leading case on the test, the tribunal in 
Tecmed v Mexico has been heavily criticised by scholars for failing to administer the full 
necessity criterion.  As Leonhardsen notes, the tribunal in Tecmed seemed to skip the 
analysis of the states measure’s necessity altogether.250  As Henckels goes on to note: 
 
Proceeding directly to assess a measure’s strict proportionality entails arriving at a 
normative judgement about whether the importance of achieving the objective 
outweighs the objective of preventing harm to the investor’s interests without first 
evaluating suitability (likely effectiveness) of the measure to achieve its objective 
nor whether alternative measures are open to the host state to achieve its 
objective.251 
 
The tribunal in Tecmed was not alone in being selective of how to apply the necessity 
criterion to the facts.  The tribunal in Saluka v Czech Republic followed the approach of 
Tecmed: 
 
The determination of a breach … requires a weighing of the Claimant’s legitimate 
and reasonable expectations on the one hand and the Respondent’s legitimate 
regulatory interests on the other.  A foreign investor protected by the Treaty may in 
any case properly expect that the Czech Republic implements its policies bona fide 
by conduct that is, as far as it affects the investors’ investment, reasonably 
justifiable by public policies and that such conduct does not manifestly violate the 
requirements of consistency, transparency, even-handedness and non 
discrimination. In particular, any differential treatment of a foreign investor must 
not be based on unreasonable distinctions and demands, and must be justified by 
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showing that it bears a reasonable relationship to rational policies not motivated by 
a preference for other investments over the foreign-owned investment.252 
 
This approach was followed in other investment law disputes regarding indirect 
expropriation.  In the case of EDF Limited v Romania253 the tribunal, in applying the 
proportionality approach to the dispute, also applied a strict necessity analysis.254  It failed 
to undertake “…a full analysis of the preliminary stages of assessment of regulatory 
objective, suitability and necessity”.255    
 
As evidenced from the discussion above, there are multiple formulations emerging on how 
the necessity criterion is to be applied.  Furthermore as noted by Leonhardsen there is 
evidence of differing approaches to proportionality in different fields and settings.256 The 
difficulty therefore is deciding on which of these approaches to applying the necessity 
criterion is correct in the context of resolving investment disputes.  While scholars do 
criticise the approach of the tribunal in Tecmed v Mexico, there is no evidence from other 
tribunals to suggest that any ruling is per se wrong.  The implication therefore is that most 
if not all of these differing interpretations and applications of the necessity criterion are 
valid.  However this does not bode well for the use of the criterion in attempting to 
distinguish between indirect and regulatory expropriation.  The substance of the criterion 
has been proven to have become porous, in that it invites tribunals to consider competing 
approaches.  This variety of approaches, all of which may well be valid, prevent the 
criterion from operating as an exclusionary tool in the resolution of investment disputes 
which greatly reduces its utility as a legal doctrine. 
 
Each of the component parts of the proportionality approach seem to suffer from 
significant flaws in that they are either the subject of various different interpretations, or 
are so vague that they require adjudicators to involve other considerations before they can 
come to a decision.  The concepts, or rather the ways that tribunals have applied them, do 
not allow for any degree of predictability in deciding on claims of indirect or regulatory 
expropriation.  As has been observed by one tribunal: 
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[p]redictability is one of the most important objectives of any legal system.  It 
would be useful if it were absolutely clear in advance whether particular events fall 
within the definition of ‘indirect expropriation’…But there is no checklist, no 
mechanical test to achieve that purpose.  The decisive considerations vary from 
case to case, depending not only on the specific facts at grievance, but also on the 
way the evidence is presented, and the legal bases pleaded.  The outcome is 
judgement, i.e. the product of discernment, and not the printout of a computer 
program.257 
 
It is suggested that the proportionality approach is not sufficient to maintain the distinction 
between indirect expropriation and regulatory expropriation in international investment 
law. Having identified weaknesses in the analytical framework that tribunals employ in 
attempting to distinguish between indirect and regulatory expropriation the issue is 
whether or not indirect and regulatory expropriation as concepts, are dealt with in a more 
consistent and predictable manner, which allows for their labelling as distinctive practices 
to be credibly maintained. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
257 Generation Ukraine v Ukraine, Award, 16 December 2003, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/9, para 20.29.  
Available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0358.pdf  
61 
 
Chapter 5 
Questioning conceptual distinctions 
 
To recap, in international investment law state measures that leave the legal title to 
property intact, but have some other negative impact on, or restricts the value of an 
investment may amount to indirect expropriation.  This requires that investors be 
compensated for their loss.  However international tribunals and academics also recognise 
that state actions that are taken in exercise of police powers, regulatory expropriation, in 
principle should not require foreign investors to be compensated.258  The reason for this is 
found in the concept of state sovereignty which is thus seen to act as a restriction on the 
investors’ right to compensation.  What this chapter intends to demonstrate is how the 
proposition that indirect and regulatory expropriation are distinct legal phenomena can be 
brought into question.  This chapter will evidence how tribunals in presenting the two 
doctrines as theoretically distinct nevertheless seem to focus on the same conceptual 
structures.259  In all of the cases that shall be discussed, the tribunals return to deal with the 
same analytical elements.  Furthermore this chapter will demonstrate how in arriving at 
their decisions, tribunals are inconsistent in their reasoning as to what aspects of a dispute 
are important in distinguishing indirect expropriation from regulatory expropriation.   
The available literature on the indirect/ regulatory expropriation distinction is both wide 
and dense.  The tribunal decisions that are discussed below, it is suggested, are particularly 
useful in demonstrating the confusion that seems prevalent in international investment law 
in treating indirect expropriation and regulatory expropriation by a state as wholly distinct 
legal phenomena. 
The claim of an indirect expropriation of foreign investors property was the subject of 
debate in the case of Biloune v Ghana Investment Centre.260  Mr Antoine Biloune, a Syrian 
national held 60% equity interest in MCDL, a corporation incorporated in Ghana.  MCDL 
was initially granted a lease in November 1985 by GTDC (a corporation owned and 
formed by the Ghanaian Government to operate tourist facilities) to renovate and manage a 
restaurant at the Marine Drive Complex in Accra, Ghana.  In 1986, MCDL formed a joint 
venture with GTDC for the construction of a 4-star hotel resort complex.  The project was 
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approved by the Ghana Investments Centre in the “GIC Agreement”.  MCDL completed a 
great deal of remodelling and construction, when the Accra City Council issued an order 
for operations to cease owing to the lack of a building permit.  The City Council then 
demolished part of the project, and Mr. Biloune, and others were subjected to financial 
scrutiny by the authorities, after which Mr Biloune was arrested, held in custody for 13 
days without charge, and subsequently deported from Ghana to Togo.  The Government 
then closed the site of the project.  Mr Biloune was not permitted to return to Ghana and 
MCDL was not allowed to carry out any further work on the project, which remained 
uncompleted.   
The Government claimed that its actions were due to a failure by GTDC to obtain a permit 
for the works it had carried out.261  The tribunal was puzzled by the motivations of the 
Ghanaian government for acting in the way that it did: 
The motivations for the actions and omissions of the Ghanaian governmental 
authorities are unclear.262   
However the tribunal ruled that this constituted an instance of ‘constructive’ or indirect 
expropriation and said the following on the motivations of the Ghanaian Government: 
…the Tribunal need not establish those motivations to come to a conclusion in this 
case.  What is clear is that the conjunction of the stop work order, the demolition, 
the summons, the arrest, the detention, the requirement of filing assets with 
declaration forms, and the deportation of Mr. Biloune without possibility of re-
entry had the effect of causing the irreparable cessation of work on the project.263 
 
The tribunal makes very clear that while none of the individual measures pursued by the 
state could be wholly determinate, the combination of state measures taken against MCDL 
and Mr Biloune were sufficient to cause the investment significant harm, in preventing its 
purpose from being realised in the completion of the project.  The Tribunal goes on to 
note: 
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Given the central role of Mr Biloune in promoting, financing and managing 
MDCL, his expulsion from the country effectively prevented MCDL from further 
pursuing the project.  In view of the Tribunal, such prevention of MCDL from 
pursuing its approved project would constitute constructive expropriation of 
MCDL’s contractual rights in the project and, accordingly, the expropriation of the 
value of MR Biloune’s interest in MDCL, unless the Respondents can establish by 
persuasive evidence justification for these events.264 
 
Based on the ruling by the tribunal in this case, the purpose of the respondent for pursuing 
the action that became the subject of the dispute was irrelevant to its being classified as an 
indirect or regulatory expropriation.  Rather what appears to have been the deciding factor 
in deeming this to be an instance of indirect expropriation, was the level of damage 
suffered by the investor.   
The tribunal identifies a state measure that was taken with a public purpose, which in this 
case the tribunal cannot identify, that has a negative effect on an investment.  These three 
facets are clearly identifiable as the concepts which the tribunal points out in identifying 
the dispute as an instance of indirect expropriation.  Therefore it seems reasonable to infer 
that regulatory expropriation would be conceptually quite different from an instance of 
indirect expropriation, given that its occurrence will not attract the requirement of 
compensation for investors.  
However a counterpoint to the idea that regulation by a state is not expropriatory is that, as 
Newcombe writes, “by definition, almost any government regulation restricts property 
rights”.265  Furthermore as Dolzer and Schreuer write, instances of state regulation are 
dealt with by investment tribunals under the same rules as cases of indirect 
expropriation.266  Moreover in discussing the impact of a States regulatory practices on 
foreign investments, tribunals have acknowledged that it is “…undisputable” that the 
exercise of police powers can cause economic damage to a foreign investment.267   
Therefor as has been noted by Barklem et al: 
In practice, protection against indirect appropriation means a foreign investor is 
entitled to file a claim against a host state on the grounds that the state when 
                                                          
264 Ibid 
265 Newcombe, supra n5, p24 
266 Dolzer and  Schreuer, supra n1, p120 
267 Tecmed v Mexico, supra n94, para 119.  See also Choudhury, supra n221, p794  
64 
 
exercising its regulatory powers (e.g. a law, decree, decision or other interference) 
is depriving him, wholly or partially, of his property, even if the state has not 
physically seized the asset. Under such protection, an investor can sue for economic 
loss caused by a state’s action which affects his property.268 
 
The regulatory practices of government were discussed in the landmark case of Saluka v 
Czech Republic269 which arose out of a failed privatisation of the Czech Republic’s third 
largest bank, IPB.  In 1998, the government sold a controlling block of IPB shares to 
Nomura Europe, which in turn transferred them to its subsidiary, Saluka Investments BC, a 
Nomura special-purpose company that was incorporated in the Netherlands.  While the 
bank’s performance was considerably improved under its new owner and management, the 
IPB still lacked sufficient operating capital and was burdened by a large amount of non-
performing loans.  In 1999 and 2000, the Czech government continued to privatise state 
owned banks and began to supervise the sector more closely.  After repeatedly failing to 
comply with new and more stringent regulatory requirements, in June 2000 the IPB was 
put under forced administration by the Czech National Bank and then sold to another 
banking group.  Nomura lost managerial control over the IPB bank and the IPB shares is 
held through Saluka were rendered worthless.    Saluka brought a claim before an 
investment tribunal alleging, amongst other things, that the actions of the Czech 
Government had expropriated its investment in IPB.   
 
The tribunal set about establishing whether or not Saluka’s shares were an investment 
under international law: 
 
Saluka’s shares in IPB were assets entitled to protection under the Treaty.  Pursuant 
to Article 5 of the Treaty, the Czech Republic was prohibited from taking any 
measures depriving, directly or indirectly, Saluka of its investment in IPB unless 
one or more of the cumulative conditions set out in that Article were complied 
with.  If the Tribunal finds that the Czech Republic has adopted such measures 
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without having complied with one or more of these conditions, the conclusion will 
inevitably follow that the Respondent has breached Article 5 of the Treaty.270   
 
It is clear from the tribunal’s formulation that the investment was subject to protection 
under the Treaty, and therefore under international law.  As such investors were entitled to 
expect that their investment would not become the subject of an expropriation claim.  The 
tribunal then went on to consider what had happened to the investment made by Saluka in 
the Czech Republic. It noted that Saluka had been deprived of its investment as a result of 
the forced administration by the Czech National Bank: 
 
There can be no doubt, and the Tribunal so finds, that Saluka has been deprived of 
its investment in IPB as a result of the imposition of the forced administration of 
the bank by the CNB on 16 June 2000.271 
 
The process which the tribunal follows appears to be relatively linear.  It has identified that 
the property of a foreign investor, Saluka, was the subject of protection by an investment 
treaty with the Czech Republic, and that the investment had been damaged as a result of 
the action taken by the Central Czech National Bank as state regulator for the industry.    
 
Nevertheless the tribunal recited the position of state regulation in international investment 
law: 
[i]t is now established in international law that States are not liable to pay 
compensation to a foreign investor when, in the normal exercise of their regulatory 
powers, they adopt in a non-discriminatory manner bona fide regulations that are 
aimed at the general welfare.272 
 
The tribunal acknowledges that in international law state regulation, in pursuance of 
accepted goals or objectives, would not be deemed expropriatory. The tribunal then made a 
comment on the application of the doctrines of indirect and regulatory expropriation in the 
adjudication of investment disputes: 
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…international law…has yet to draw a bright and easily distinguishable line 
between non-compensable regulations on the one hand and, on the other, measures 
that have the effect of depriving foreign investors of their investment and are thus 
unlawful and compensable in international law.273 
 
This comment is significant in that the tribunal directly addresses the difficulties in 
labelling state conduct as being either indirect expropriation or regulatory expropriation.  It 
points out that the rules which it must apply in deciding on investment disputes are unclear.  
Despite this the tribunal attributed a great deal of attention to the ability under domestic 
Czech law for the National Bank, as industry regulator,  to force banks into administration 
where their shareholders have not taken measures to correct deficiencies in a banks 
performance with a view to protect the stability of the Czech banking system.274  The 
Tribunal attached importance to this, and held that the National Banks forced 
administration of IPB was: 
 
…a lawful and permissible regulatory action by the Czech Republic aimed at the 
general welfare of the State, and does not fall within the ambit of any of the 
exceptions to the permissibility of regulatory action which are recognised by 
customary international law.  Accordingly, the CNB’s decision did not, fall within 
the notion of a “deprivation” referred to in Article 5 of the Treaty, and thus did not 
involve a breach of the Respondent’s obligations under that Article.275 
 
The tribunal in this case was motivated by the public utility that the state measure was 
alleged to serve, and felt that the end was sufficiently legitimate to justify the means where 
it held the action of the Czech Government regulatory and not to be expropriatory,276 
“…notwithstanding that the measure had the effect of eviscerating Saluka’s investment in 
IPB”.277   
The tribunal’s arguments and ultimate ruling in this case is consistent with the idea of a 
framework where a state’s actions, or that of state regulatory bodies, taken in pursuance of 
what is bona fide regulation or the exercise of police powers in international law will not 
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be expropriation.  Interestingly however, in dealing with what it deemed to be an entirely 
separate situation, that of bona fide state regulation, the tribunal in this case returned to the 
same formula as that used in Biloune.  Discussion was centred around how a state measure, 
taken with a public purpose, had the negative impact on the investment.  This leads one to 
question how distinct the doctrines of indirect expropriation and regulation are when 
discussion on two theoretically different  practices involve the same conceptual tropes: that 
of a state measure taken with a view to protect some kind of public or state interest which 
has the same identifiable effect on an investors property i.e. an investment is harmed by a 
states actions.  In Saluka the state measure, aimed at protecting banking stability, resulted 
in the investment being “eviscerated”, and in Biloune the states actions resulted in the 
“irreparable cessation of work”.  The tribunal in Saluka leads the observer away from this 
point, in holding that the facts of the case are indicative of bona fide state regulatory 
practices.  Therefor while the investor does suffer damage, it is deemed to be ‘legitimate’ 
damage in the circumstances.  Moreover there appears to be a conflict in these two cases as 
to what the deciding factor has been in arriving at their respective rulings.  This will be 
explored in greater detail throughout this chapter. 
This same difficulty of distinguishing indirect expropriation from regulatory expropriation 
is apparent in other cases.   A clear example of this was in the case of CME v Czech 
Republic.278 Operating under the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
(UNCITRAL) rules, the tribunal in this case had to decide on whether the interference by 
the Czech Media Council, with the contract rights of the claimant’s subsidiary CNTS, 
constituted an indirect expropriation. In January 1993, the Czech Media Council issued a 
broadcasting license to CET 21, a Czech company that the claimant in the dispute had 
agreed to finance.  This decision, in allowing foreign capital to have control over the 
Licence, was the subject of intense criticism locally.  To resolve the dispute CME and CET 
21 agreed to form a new Czech company called CNTS.  In exchange for ownership in the 
company, CET 21 provided CNTS with “irrevocable and exclusive” rights to the Licence.  
After a period of time, the Media Council expressed concerns that CNTS was improperly 
broadcasting without a licence.  CNTS and CET 21 attempted to address these concerns by 
clarifying that CET held the Licence and was in operational control of broadcasting, and 
CNTS only arranged services for CET 21’s activities. In 1999 disputes arose between CET 
21 and CNTS because CET 21 no longer wanted to contract exclusively with CNTS for 
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broadcasting services related to the Licence.  The Media Council also provided a letter that 
stated that CNTS did not have exclusive rights related to the Licence.  CME argued that 
amongst other things, the action of the Czech Republic through the Media Council 
amounted to an expropriation.  The Czech Republic defended the actions of the Media 
Council in many ways, including that the Council was merely monitoring and enforcing 
domestic law as industry regulator.  
 
The tribunal noted that the practice of states or state regulators making changes to basis of 
an investment agreement is not uncommon in international investment law.  However it did 
note that such practices are subject to limitations: 
 
The Czech Republic and/ or the Media Council are as a matter of principle not 
debarred from amending or altering the basis for CME’s investment, subject to the 
acquired rights and treaty obligations.  This is a question of the Czech Republic’s 
national sovereignty.  However any such action must have been done under due 
process of law, providing just compensation (Art.5 of the Treaty).279   
 
This comment is useful in that it sheds light on the reasoning of the tribunal in this 
instance.  In deciding on the dispute, it seems clear that the tribunal was being guided by 
the necessity for “…due process of law…” to be observed, in deciding on whether indirect 
expropriation or regulatory expropriation had taken place.  The tribunal then turned its 
attention to the facts of the case as it saw them: 
 
The silent and coerced vitiation of CME’s basis for its investment does not fulfil 
such a requirement and is, therefore, under the standards of the Treaty, and the 
rules of international law, a breach of treaty obligations.280 
 
The meaning of the tribunal’s argument is unmistakable.  The state regulators interference 
with the investment had resulted in a breach of international law.  The tribunal in deciding 
whether or not the actions of the state constituted the indirect expropriation of CME’s 
investment, adopted very familiar language to that of cases of supposed regulatory 
expropriation by states in describing the situation: 
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The Media Council’s actions and omissions…caused the destructions of CNTS’ 
operations, leaving CNTS as a company with assets, but without business…What 
was touched and indeed destroyed was the Claimant’s and its predecessor’s 
investment as protected by the Treaty.  What was destroyed was the commercial 
value of the investment…by reason of coercion exerted by the Media Council.281 
 
The tribunal identifies that while the assets are still within CNTS’ control, its relationship 
with CET 21 was ultimately destroyed following the interference by the state regulator.  
The tribunal went on to note that: 
 
The expropriation claim is sustained despite the fact that the Media Council did not 
expropriate CME by express measures of expropriation.  De facto expropriation or 
indirect expropriations, i.e. measures that do not involve overt taking but that 
effectively neutralize the benefit of the property of the foreign owner, are subject to 
expropriation claims.282 
 
The tribunal goes on to reiterate the doctrinal understanding of indirect expropriation in 
international investment law.  The actions of the state regulator are deemed by the tribunal 
to be typical of this practice, and it goes on to hold that: 
 
Expropriation of CME’s investment is found as a consequence of the Media 
Council’s actions and inactions as there is no immediate prospect at hand that 
CNTS will be reinstated in a position to enjoy an exclusive use of the 
licence…There is no immediate prospect at hand that CNTS can resume its 
broadcasting operations, as they were in 1996 before the legal protection of the use 
of the licence was eliminated.283 
  
The tribunal ruled that the Media Council, as an organ of the Czech state had indirectly 
expropriated CME’s investment, owing to the fact that the Council had not observed due 
process in its dealings with CET 21 and CNTS.  The tribunal points out that while states 
are entitled to pursue activities that are in line with national sovereignty, this must be done 
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in observance of due process of law.  It found that this was not the case in this dispute.  
This ruling is demonstrative of how yet again the tribunal draws on the same set of 
conceptual tropes - a state measure, that has been taken for a public purpose, which has a 
negative impact on an investment - that could have otherwise been used to justify arriving 
at the entirely opposite finding of regulatory expropriation.  Furthermore the case 
demonstrates the inconsistency in how tribunals decide on claims of indirect and regulatory 
expropriation.  Unlike in the case of Saluka where the ‘public purpose’ was the deciding 
factor in the tribunals decision, or in Biloune where the damage to the investment was 
deemed crucial to the tribunals finding, CME saw the tribunal attach particular importance 
to ‘due process of law’ in arriving at its decision. 
 
Another topical case on the distinction between indirect expropriation and regulatory 
expropriation, and arguably one of the most controversial investment law decisions to have 
been decided was that of Santa Elena v Costa Rica.284   Compañía del Desarrollo de Santa 
Elena, S.A. (“CDSE”) was a Costa Rican corporation, whose majority shareholders were 
US nationals. In 1970 CDSE purchased the property known as “Santa Elena”. This 
property was situated within Costa Rica and was composed of Pacific coastline, rivers and 
springs and several mountains, forests and valleys. CDSE bought Santa Elena for 
US$395,000 with the intention of developing it as a tourist resort and residential 
community. CDSE began to design a land development program and undertook a variety 
of financial and technical analyses of the property with a view to its development.  In 1978 
Costa Rica issued a decree of expropriation in respect of Santa Elena (the “1978 Decree”), 
so to add it to the Santa Rosa National Park and contribute to the preservation of rare 
species. Although the property remained in the de facto possession of CDSE, it could no 
longer pursue its plans to develop the area into a tourist resort. To compensate CDSE for 
expropriation, Costa Rica proposed to pay CDSE approximately US$ 1,900,000. CDSE did 
not object to expropriation per se but questioned the price fixed by Costa Rica. CDSE 
organised its own evaluation of the property (also in 1978) and claimed that US$ 6,400,000 
as compensation was merited. During the subsequent twenty-year period the parties were 
involved in litigation before Costa Rican courts, with the amount of compensation 
remaining unresolved. Under political pressure from the US Government, in 1995 Costa 
Rica consented to turn this matter to over to the ICSID  for arbitration. 
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This case was arguably unique among the majority of claims to be brought to international 
arbitration.  The parties in this case did not disagree on whether expropriation had 
occurred: 
 
International law permits the Government of Costa Rica to expropriate foreign-
owned property within its territory for a public purpose and against the prompt 
payment of adequate and effective compensation.  This is not in dispute between 
the parties.285 
 
Rather the issue at hand was on the level of compensation to be paid to the investors.  
However the Tribunal, in fixing the level of compensation to be paid, made the following 
observations of Costa Rica’s conduct in attempting to preserve its natural environment: 
 
 While an expropriation or taking for environmental reasons may be classified as a 
taking for a public purpose, and thus may be legitimate, the fact that the Property 
was taken for this reason does not affect either the nature or the measure of the 
compensation to be paid for the taking. That is, the purpose of protecting the 
environment for which the Property was taken does not alter the legal character of 
the taking for which adequate compensation must be paid.  The international source 
of the obligation to protect the environment makes no difference.286 
 
The tribunal then went on to state that: 
 
Expropriatory environmental measures—no matter how laudable and beneficial to 
society as a whole—are, in this respect, similar to any other expropriatory measures 
that a state may take in order to implement its policies: where property is 
expropriated, even for environmental purposes, whether domestic or international, 
the state’s obligation to pay compensation remains.287 
 
The point made by the tribunal at this point became the subject of some contention.  As 
noted by Kulick the reasoning of the court is rather appealing: 
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…Every expropriation requires a public purpose, thus public interest concerns such 
as preventing the natural diversity of flora and fauna may well serve as a public 
purpose but do not affect the host State’s obligation to pay compensation.  Indeed, 
if a host State was able to allege public interest concerns in general as a basis for 
justification of expropriation, the investor’s protection in this regard would simply 
render void given the myriad of public purposes possible.288 
 
It should be noted however that this ruling has not been received favourably in 
international investment law.  The tribunal took a relatively blunt approach to the indirect 
expropriation/ regulatory expropriation distinction that had become prevalent in investment 
disputes, and held that there is no such thing as regulatory expropriation in international 
investment law: each and every expropriation by a state of a foreign investors property 
would require compensation.   
 
Another widely reported decision on the question of indirect and regulatory expropriation 
was that of Tecmed v Mexico289.  The tribunal in this case employed remarkably similar 
language to that used in Saluka in describing the impact of a state measure on a foreign 
investment that was ultimately characterised as indirectly expropriatory.  The details of this 
case were briefly mentioned in Chapter 1, but merits more detailed analysis.  The dispute 
concerned the decision by the state of Mexico, via an environmental agency of the 
Mexican Federal Government known as INE, not to renew a licence for Tecmed to operate 
a landfill and the accompanying impact on Tecmed.  It was claimed that this was an act of 
expropriation by the state of Mexico, which was defended as a “…control measure in a 
highly regulated sector and which is very closely linked to public interests”.290  The 
tribunal submitted the factual circumstances to extensive review.   
In answering the question as to whether or not Tecmed’s investment had been 
expropriated, the tribunal first turned its attention to whether or not it had been deprived of 
its investment following the decision of INE not to renew the permit licence.  The tribunal 
made the following comments in this regard: 
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Undoubtedly it has provided for the non-renewal of the Permit and the closing of 
the Landfill permanently and irrevocably, not only due to the imperative 
affirmative and irrevocable terms under which the INE’s decision included in the 
resolution is formulated, which constitutes an action – and not a mere omission – 
attributable to the Respondent, with negative effects on the Claimant’s investment 
and its rights to obtain the benefits arising therefrom, but also because after the 
non-renewal of the Permit, the Mexican regulations issued by INE became fully 
applicable. …When the Resolution put an end to such operations and activities at 
the Las Viboras site, the economic or commercial value directly or indirectly 
associated with those operations and activities and with the assets earmarked for 
such operations and activities was irremediably destroyed. 291 
 
The tribunal was in little doubt that the measure taken by INE were attributable to the state.  
Furthermore the tribunal had no difficulty in finding that the investors had lost the entirety 
of their investment.  As in other cases of indirect expropriation, the tribunal did however 
consider it necessary to evaluate whether the decision not to renew the licence could be 
expropriatory, in light of the underpinning purpose.  The tribunal adopted a rather different 
approach to dealing with investment disputes that concerned the arguments over the use of 
police powers than that which had been seen in previous tribunals.  In dealing with the 
dispute the tribunal was very conscious that its role was not to review the motivating 
purpose of a state measure to determine whether or not it was legally issued.292  
Furthermore the tribunal did acknowledge the position of the doctrine of ‘police power’ 
regulation in international investment law: 
 
The principle that the State’s exercise of its sovereign powers within the framework 
of its police power may cause economic damage to those subject to its powers as 
administrator without entitling them to compensation is undisputable.293 
 
However it then went on to make the following comments: 
 
After reading Article 5(1) of the Agreement and interpreting its terms according to 
the ordinary meaning given to them (Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention), we 
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find no principle stating that regulatory administrative actions are per se excluded 
from the scope of Agreement, even if they are beneficial to society as a whole – 
such as environmental protection – particularly if the negative economic impact of 
such actions on the financial position of the investor is sufficient to neutralize in 
full the value, or economic or commercial use of its investment without receiving 
any compensation whatsoever.294 
 
These comments are significant, but are not uncommon in investment disputes.  The 
tribunal disagreed with the argument, as was mentioned in Saluka, that regulatory powers 
by a state are non-compensable.  Moreover the tribunal was not convinced that the 
measures pursued by the state in failing to renew the licence were motivated by a desire to 
protect “…the environment or public health”.295  The tribunal then went on to state that it 
must: 
 
for the purpose of establishing whether the Respondent breached Article 5(1) of the 
Agreement, to evaluate such reasons as a whole to determine whether the 
Resolution is proportional to the deprivation of rights sustained by [Tecmed] and 
with the negative economic impact on the Claimant arising from such 
deprivation.296  
 
The tribunal went on to acknowledge that, as the Respondent had suggested, there were 
“socio-political circumstances” which motivated the decision not to renew the licence, by 
way of local opposition to the operation and location of the landfill.297  However the 
tribunal went on to state in holding that Mexico had indirectly expropriated the investment: 
 
the Respondent has not presented any evidence that community opposition to the 
Landfill —however intense, aggressive and sustained— was in any way massive … 
Even after having gained substantial momentum, community opposition, although 
it had been sustained by its advocates through an insistent, active and continuous 
public campaign in the mass media, could gather on two occasions a crowd of only 
two hundred people the first time and of four hundred people, the second time out 
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of a community with a population of almost one million inhabitants…Additionally, 
the “blockage” of the Landfill was carried out by small groups of no more than 
forty people [footnote omitted].  The absence of any evidence that the operation of 
the Landfill was a real or potential threat to the environment or to the public health, 
coupled with the absence of massive opposition, limits “community pressure” to a 
series of events, which, although they amount to significant pressure on the 
Mexican authorities, do not constitute a real crisis or disaster of great proportions, 
triggered by acts or omissions committed by the foreign investor or its affiliates.298  
 
Once again the same conceptual tropes of a state measure, taken for a public purpose that 
has a negative impact on an investment are readily identifiable.  This is simply another 
example of how readily identifiable these traits are when tribunals are dealing with claims 
of alleged expropriation of investments.  The difficulty however is that these same tropes 
are being engaged by tribunals when they discuss, what is understood to be a completely 
distinct practice of police power regulation  This only serves to confuse the distinction, and 
bring its existence in dispute resolution into question.  Furthermore as can be gleamed 
from the discussion above the tribunal employs a wholly new criterion for deciding that an 
indirect expropriation has occurred.  Unlike in previous cases where due process or a 
public purpose has been the deciding factor, the tribunal utilises the concept of 
proportionality to make its decision.  This demonstrates the continuing inconsistency with 
which tribunals adjudicate on investment disputes.  
 
Another notable case on the indirect expropriation/ regulation distinction was that of Pope 
and Talbot v Canada.299  The case concerned a dispute regarding Canada’s actions in the 
implementation of the 5-year Softwood Lumber Agreement (“SLA”) concluded by Canada 
and the U.S. in 1996. The Investor claimed that certain aspects of Canada’s 
implementation of the SLA via its Export Control Regime constituted a breach by Canada 
of, among other things, the provisions under NAFTA Chapter 1 that it not expropriate the 
investment.  The tribunal in dealing with the expropriation claim was very clear of the 
position of Pope and Talbot’s investment: 
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The Tribunal concludes that the Investment’s access to the US market is a property 
interest subject to protection under Article 1110.300 
 
In making this statement the tribunal set out very clearly that Pope and Talbot’s investment 
was covered by the terms of NAFTA.  The tribunal went on to deal with the claim by 
Canada that “…the ability to sell lumber to the U.S. market is not an investment within the 
meaning of NAFTA”301.  The tribunal was not convinced of Canada’s claim that Pope and 
Talbot’s investment did not fall within the definition of the trade agreement: 
 
While Canada suggests that the ability to sell softwood lumber from British 
Columbia to the U.S. is an abstraction, it is, in fact, a very important part of the 
"business" of the Investment. Interference with that business would necessarily 
have an adverse effect on the property that the Investor has acquired in Canada, 
which. of course, constitutes the Investment. While Canada's focus on the "access 
to the U.S. market" may reflect only the Investor's own terminology, that 
terminology should not mask the fact that the true interests at stake are the 
Investment's asset base, the value of which is largely dependent on its export 
business. The Tribunal concludes that the Investor properly asserts that Canada has 
taken measures affecting its "investment," as that term is defined in Article 1139 
and used in Article 1110.302 
 
The framework that the tribunal appears to be following looks to be similar to that that has 
been employed by many other tribunals.  The investment has been recognised as being 
protected under the terms of an investment treaty from state interference, unless otherwise 
compensated.  However the Tribunal diverts from its otherwise linear path in holding that 
the actions of Canada are not expropriatory, notwithstanding that Canada’s actions had 
“…resulted in reduced profits for the investment.”303  As the tribunal goes on to state: 
 
Even accepting (for the purpose of this analysis) the allegations of the Investor 
concerning diminished profits, the Tribunal concludes that the degree of 
interference with the Investment’s operations due to the Export Control Regime 
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does not rise to an expropriation (creeping or otherwise) within the meaning of 
Article 1110.304 
 
While the tribunal in this case did not find the Canadian Government to have expropriated 
the investment, it did note Canada’s argument that because the measures that it took were 
cast as regulations exercised under its ‘police powers’ they could not be regarded as 
expropriatory.305  The Tribunal rejected this line of argument and states that:     
 
Canada appears to claim that, because the measures under consideration are cast in 
the form of regulation, they constitute an exercise of ‘police powers’, which, if non-
discriminatory, are supposedly beyond the reach of the NAFTA rules regarding 
expropriations.  While the exercise of ‘police powers’ must be analysed with 
special care, the Tribunal believes that Canada’s formulation goes too far.  
Regulations can indeed be exercised in a way that would constitute [indirect] 
expropriation.306 
 
Other than the tribunals comments mentioned above, there was no other discussion on the 
purpose of the measures taken by Canada.  The tribunal shied away from any comment on 
legitimacy of Canada’s implementation of the SLA.  By inference from the wording of the 
tribunals ruling, it appears to be the case that while again, the tribunal separates the 
doctrines of indirect expropriation and regulation on a conscious level, it does recognise 
the reality that a regulatory purpose can still in effect be expropiatory, regardless of the 
purpose pursued.  The difficulty however is that, as evidenced above, despite tribunals 
discussion of what appear to be identical concepts in two apparently distinct state practices 
the separation is still maintained.  The confusion as to why this is the case is even more 
profound when multiple tribunals, including in Pope & Talbot expressly recognise the 
ability of state regulatory measures to be expropriatory.  Furthermore the tribunal deems 
the level of harm (not) suffered by the investment to be indicative of its not being an 
instance of expropriation.  While there is some evidence that at least one tribunal has used 
this criterion in adjudicating a dispute this does not grant any greater level of consistency 
to the debate as there is no framework from which one is able to discern what factor will be 
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determinate in a given set of circumstances which are subject to an international 
arbitration.   
 
The confusion over the distinction between regulatory and indirectly expropriatory 
measures was again evident in the case of Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa v The United 
Mexican States.307 The case centred on a dispute regarding the impact of Mexican tax laws 
on the export of tobacco products by CEMSA.  CEMSA was a Mexican company, owned 
and controlled by Mr. Marvin Feldman, a US citizen. Mr Feldman claimed that through the 
conduct of its Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, the state of Mexico’s refusal to rebate 
excise taxes applied to cigarettes exported by CEMSA and Mexico’s continuing refusal to 
recognize CEMSA’s right to a rebate of such taxes regarding prospective cigarette exports 
constituted a breach of NAFTA Articles 1102 (National Treatment), 1105 (Minimum 
Level of Treatment), and crucially, 1110 (Expropriation and Compensation). Mr Feldman 
brought his claim before an ICSID tribunal for over $50 million.  The tribunal found little 
difficulty in holding that CEMA as an organisation, owned and controlled by Mr Feldman, 
was an investment and was protected under the terms of the NAFTA.308  In dealing with 
the claim that the investment had been indirectly expropriated , the tribunal considered the 
facts of the complaint and made the following comment: 
 
The facts presented here might, depending on their interpretation, appear to support 
a finding of an indirect or creeping expropriation. The Claimant, through the 
Respondent’s actions, is no longer able to engage in his business of purchasing 
Mexican cigarettes and exporting them, and has thus been deprived completely and 
permanently of any potential economic benefits from that particular activity.309 
 
The tribunal here expressly points out that because of the actions of the state of Mexico, 
through the application of its taxation laws, has “…completely and permanently” removed 
any profits or other benefit, that could have been enjoyed from the investment.  This seems 
to be territory that is all too familiar in investment disputes.  Actions of a state taken either 
directly or in this case indirectly have a negative, and in this case, disastrous impact on the 
property of an investor.     
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Furthermore in dealing with the fact that it was the impact of taxation laws which were the 
subject of the dispute the tribunal did note that there are instances where taxation could be 
deemed to be expropriatory.310  The tribunal goes on to state: 
 
The Tribunal notes that the ways in which governmental authorities may force a 
company out of business, or significantly reduce the economic benefit of its 
business, are many.  In the past, confiscatory taxation, denial of access to 
infrastructure or necessary raw materials, imposition of unreasonable regulatory 
regimes, among others, have been considered to be expropriatory actions.311 
 
This comment from the tribunal is significant in that it points out that regulatory actions by 
a state can, in certain instances result in expropriation of an investors property.  The 
tribunal went on to note that in dealing with the complaint brought before it under NAFTA, 
“…No one can seriously question that in some circumstances government regulatory 
activity can be a violation of Article 1110”.312  This admission is one of the clearest 
instances where an investment tribunal has recognised that the doctrines of indirect 
expropriation and regulatory expropriation may not be as distinct as would have 
traditionally been understood.  Furthermore the tribunal went on to note, in citing the 
ruling of the tribunal in Pope & Talbot v Canada that: 
 
Regulations can indeed be characterized in a way that would constitute creeping 
expropriation...Indeed, much creeping expropriation could be conducted by 
regulation, and a blanket exception for regulatory measures would create a gaping 
loophole in international protection against expropriation.313 
 
Despite the admission that governmental regulatory measures could be so severe as to 
amount to expropriation, the tribunal went on to rule that the actions of the state did not 
constitute expropriation.  The tribunal provided several reasons for its holding which can 
be summarised as follows: 
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(1) … not every business problem experienced by a foreign investor is an 
expropriation under Article 1110; (2) NAFTA and principles of customary 
international law do not require a state to permit “gray market” exports of 
cigarettes; (3) at no relevant time has the IEPS law, as written, afforded Mexican 
cigarette resellers such as CEMSA a “right” to export cigarettes (due primarily to 
technical/legal requirements for invoices stating tax amounts separately and to their 
status as non-taxpayers); and (4) the Claimant’s “investment,” the exporting 
business known as CEMSA, as far as this Tribunal can determine, remains under 
the complete control of the Claimant, in business with the apparent right to engage 
in the exportation of alcoholic beverages, photographic supplies, contact lenses, 
powdered milk and other Mexican products--any product that it can purchase upon 
receipt of invoices stating the tax amounts-- and to receive rebates of any 
applicable taxes under the IEPS law.314 
 
However in describing the impact of Mexico’s measures on Mr Feldmans investment, the 
tribunal stated that: 
 
The Claimant, through the Respondent’s actions, is no longer able to engage in his 
business of purchasing Mexican cigarettes and exporting them, and has thus been 
deprived completely and permanently of any potential economic benefits from that 
particular activity.315 
 
The problem with this ruling of the tribunal, in not holding the conduct of the state of 
Mexico to amount to indirect expropriation, is that it nevertheless makes use of the same 
language in discussing what has taken place.  Yet again as in other cases mentioned above, 
the actions of Mexico were such that they had a disastrous impact on the property of the 
foreign investor.  Furthermore the tribunal appears to employ the same conceptual tropes 
of a state measure that is motivated by some kind of public purpose and has a negative 
impact on the investment.  The ruling in this case however is more significant than those of 
other cases, as it expressly recognises the expropriatory trait that regulatory measures can 
demonstrate.  Moreover it provides further evidence that the frameworks of indirect 
expropriation and regulation used by tribunals are not so distinct.   
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The ruling of the tribunal is also useful in that it not only demonstrates the shared 
characteristics of indirect and regulatory expropriation, but is also demonstrative of the 
continuing inconsistency in how tribunals decide on claims of expropriation.  As the 
tribunal goes on to note, having listed the motivating factors for its decision: 
 
While none of these factors alone is necessarily conclusive, in the Tribunal’s view 
taken together they tip the expropriation / regulation balance away from a finding 
of expropriation316 
 
This does little to instil confidence in how investment tribunals arrive at their decisions.  
The language of the tribunal, it is suggested, is not demonstrative of a robust or coherent 
approach to its decision.  Rather it demonstrates an inconsistent approach to the indirect 
expropriation/ regulatory expropriation distinction that could have yielded a different 
decision depending on what the tribunal chooses to focus its attention on in the dispute. 
 
The difficulty in maintaining the indirect / regulatory expropriation distinction was again 
evident in the case of Phelps Dodge Corp v Iran.317  The Claimant, a New York 
corporation, sought compensation for the alleged expropriation of its shareholders interest 
in an Iranian company established for the purpose of manufacturing and selling various 
wire and cable products in Iran.  In November 1980, Iran transferred the management of 
the Iranian company and its factory to two agencies of the government.  Pursuant to the 
transfer, managers were appointed by the government to operate the factory; no meetings 
of the company’s board of directors or shareholders were held; and no information 
concerning the business activities and financial affairs of the Iranian company was 
provided to the Claimant.  The Iranian government claimed that the transfer measure was 
taken for the public welfare, so to prevent the closure of the factory and to ensure the 
payment of wages owed to workers and debts owed to the government.  The tribunal in this 
case stated: 
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The facts of this case…show a progressive erosion…of Phelps Dodge’s ability to 
exercise its ownership rights in SICAB.318  
 
Having reviewed the facts of the case, and the actions of the Iranian government the 
tribunal went on to state that: 
 
The conclusion is unavoidable that as of 15 November 1980, control of the SICAB 
factory was taken by the Respondent, thereby depriving Phelps Dodge of virtually 
all of the value of its property rights. It is undisputed that such deprivation has 
lasted for five years, and it seems clear to the Tribunal that it is likely to continue 
indefinitely.319 
 
Once again the framework common to both claims of indirect expropriation and regulation 
is engaged by the tribunal.  There is an identifiable negative impact to an investment, that 
is protected under an international treaty, that is attributable to the state.  The tribunal, in 
finding that an indirect expropriation had taken place, did however dedicate some thought 
to the purpose that the Iranian government claimed it was protecting in pursuing the 
measures that it did.  The tribunal went on to note that: 
 
The Tribunal fully understands the reasons why the Respondent felt compelled to 
protect its interests through this transfer of management, and the Tribunal 
understands the financial, economic and social concerns that inspired the law 
pursuant to which it acted, but those reasons and concerns cannot relieve the 
Respondent of the obligation to compensate Phelps Dodge for its loss.320 
 
Despite the tribunals holding that the measures taken by Iran amounted to an indirect 
expropriation, it did note the existence of a public purpose.  One may even go so far as to 
say that the Tribunal recognised the compelling reasons that motivated this particular 
purpose, while avoiding any comment as to its ‘legitimacy’, but could not view it as having 
so special a status to class Iran’s actions as regulatory.  Even in this case while the Tribunal 
did understand the States intentions behind its measures, as having a legitimate purpose as 
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their aim,321 Iran was still found to have pursued a measure that while regulatory in nature, 
possessed an expropriatory dimension while still pursuing a public purpose.  The tribunal 
relied on the ruling in Tippetts when it stated that: 
 
In the present case, the Respondent has taken control of the SICAB factory, it is 
running it for its own benefit and seems likely to continue to do so indefinitely.  
Consequently, it has effectively taken Phelps Dodge’s property and is liable to the 
Claimants for the value of that property.322 
 
Yet again the tribunal juggles the same readily identifiable concepts of (i) a state measure; 
(ii) taken with a public purpose; and (iii) a negative impact on the investment in arriving at 
its decision that the states actions are indirectly expropriatory.  This serves as further 
evidence that the doctrines of indirect and regulatory expropriation are insufficiently 
distinct.  The tribunal in this case also seems to base its decision on where control of the 
investment lies.  This is evidence of further inconsistency in how the tribunals base their 
decisions.  Furthermore and perhaps more worrisome in this ruling is that like that given in 
Santa Elena v Costa Rica, the tribunal recognises the motivations for governmental actions 
but nevertheless holds them to be indirectly expropriatory. 
 
The discussion above demonstrates how tribunals have, in attempting to distinguish one 
kind of state practice from another, unintentionally demonstrated their use of the same 
conceptual tropes.  The frameworks used to maintain these distinctions are not sufficiently 
distinct. It is suggested that having reviewed the decisions of investment tribunals that 
there is a deep flaw in the belief that indirect and regulatory expropriation by states are so 
dissimilar.  In each case that has been decided, there has always been a state measure that 
has a negative impact on an investment that is claimed to serve a public purpose.  However 
the question for the tribunal will be whether or not the purpose served, is sufficiently 
legitimate in their eyes to sway their decision.   In deciding on this question different 
tribunals have, as has been demonstrated, used different criterions on which to base their 
decisions.  This suggests that the boundary between indirect expropriation and regulatory 
expropriation is not sufficiently stable to be deployed by adjudicators in investment 
disputes.  
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
 
This thesis has examined the established wisdom regarding a significant distinction that 
exists in international investment law: indirect and regulatory expropriation.  The aim has 
been to subject this distinction to critical review.  In order to have carried out this 
objective, this thesis has had to employ a deconstructive analysis of the current position in 
international investment law, to expose conceptual ambiguities, contradictions and 
weaknesses that exist within the legal framework on which this distinction is based and 
which is meant to be understood in terms of. 
 
What has been the result of this exercise?  Is the distinction between these two practices to 
be taken seriously? 
 
There are several insights that this thesis has yielded.  However before these insights are 
discussed, a few preliminary remarks are necessary.  It is suggested that the creation of the 
doctrines of indirect and regulatory expropriation was an attempt to deal with a problem: 
holding states responsible for underhanded expropriations of foreign investors property 
while still recognizing the prerogatives of self-governance.  While this solution may have 
been acceptable to many, there are questions surrounding its rigour.   
 
As the discussion above has demonstrated, in international investment law literature, case-
law and state practice – in the context of drafting investment treaties – there are multiple 
conflicting definitions of indirect expropriation.323  While it is true that there are some 
common strands which are identifiable, the presence of multiple ideas about how indirect 
expropriation by states is defined or recognised inspires little confidence as to its 
credibility.  Moreover the mere fact that multiple definitions exist is demonstrative of the 
fact that there is a degree of dissatisfaction with what has been proposed.  For the concept 
of indirect expropriation to be taken seriously, it must be more clearly defined.  
Unfortunately this has not proved possible.  It is suggested that whilst unhelpful, the 
practice of actors in international investment law is to attempt to deal with instances of 
indirect expropriation on the basis of, as Fortier and Drymer write, ‘I Know it When I See 
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It’ as none of the existing definitions provide sufficient guidance for tribunals to be able to 
identify indirect expropriation in the context of investment disputes.   
. 
The current position regarding state regulation of foreign investments, or regulatory 
expropriation, in international law is also unsatisfactory.  There is a significant volume of 
evidence to be found in both scholarly and judicial sources, that supports the proposition 
that states are entitled to regulate domestic affairs in international law through use of their 
‘police powers’.  However there is considerable disagreement as to what the substance of 
‘police power’ regulation actually means324.  As before it is suggested that before the 
doctrine can be taken seriously and applied consistently, there must be clarity on its 
meaning.   Not only do tribunals and scholars, as evidenced, disagree on the substance of 
the ‘police powers’ doctrine.  Some tribunals have even gone so far as to suggest that there 
has never been any consensus on this point, while others suggest that there is little merit in 
clinging to the idea that states should be excused from the requirement to compensate 
investors for regulatory expropriation.325 
 
It appears that despite the evidence as to the many weaknesses that the distinction between 
regulatory and indirect expropriation suffers from, many of these have been overlooked.  
The distinction is maintained and over the course of time, tribunals have employed new 
tools with which to recognise the distinction.  Historically some tribunals utilised single 
criteria on which to base their distinction, either through use of the ‘sole effect’ or ‘public 
purpose’ doctrine.  Both of these approaches however have been identified to suffer from 
many inadequacies in the context of investment disputes.326  As a result the new trend in 
investment law saw the use of a more multifaceted analysis, via the introduction of the so-
called  proportionality approach.327  While there are many reasons to support the use of a 
proportionality approach in investment disputes, like its predecessors it also remains 
subject to criticism.   
 
The proportionality approach as it currently stands, is insufficiently clear and precise to 
lend itself well to effective use in legal disputes.328  It invites those sitting on arbitration 
panels to advance their own subjective views regarding the meaning of various criteria in 
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applying proportionality.  The situation is complicated even further by the fact that, not 
only do competing interpretations exist, but all of these are also equally valid in their own 
way.  There is no logical reason to doubt any of the competing approaches to applying the 
proportionality approach.  Therefore one must question its utility as a legal doctrine: each 
of its components is vague, imprecise and invites competing interpretations.  It cannot be 
used to provide clear, authoritative and consistent decision making in investment law.   
 
Despite the evidence as to the vagueness of the distinction between indirect and regulatory 
expropriation, and the weaknesses suffered by the proportionality approach to recognise 
the distinction, tribunals continue to recognise their utility.  However indirect and 
regulatory expropriation suffer a fatal flaw in their construction as distinctive state 
practices.  As has been evidenced in this thesis, tribunals continually speak of each practice 
by reference to the same shared conceptual tropes: a state measure, that has been taken for 
a public purpose, which has a negative impact on an investment. 329 
 
The findings of this thesis are that the distinction between indirect and regulatory 
expropriation is not based on a theoretical framework that is coherent, precise and 
identifiable.  The tools through which international investment law identifies indirect and 
regulatory expropriation are not suited to the task they are employed to tackle.  They allow 
tribunals to form their own view as to the meaning of a legal approach to decision making: 
they invite political decision making in legal disputes.  As a result the underlying doctrinal 
structure is insufficiently clear and conceptually stable to be credibly used in the context of 
legal adjudication. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
329 See Chapter 4, pp61-84  
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